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Certain Prosecutors: Geographical
Arbitrariness, Unusualness, & the
Abolition of Virginia’s Death Penalty
Bernadette M. Donovan*
Abstract
Virginia’s abolition of the death penalty in 2021 was a historic
development. As both a southern state and one of the country’s most
active death penalty jurisdictions, Virginia’s transition away from
capital punishment represented an important shift in the national
landscape. This article considers whether that shift has any
constitutional significance, focusing on the effect of Virginia’s
abolition on the geographical arbitrariness of the country’s death
penalty.
As a starting point, the death penalty in America is primarily
regulated by the Eighth Amendment, which bars “cruel and
unusual punishments.” The United States Supreme Court has held
that the death penalty is not per se unconstitutional, but that the
Eighth Amendment constrains its application. In particular,
modern death penalty law is concerned with the arbitrary or
unusual infliction of the death penalty. Since 2015, the concept of
“geographical arbitrariness”—that the death penalty’s localization
could render it so random or rare as to be unconstitutional—has
gained increased attention.
This Article examines whether and how Virginia’s abolition
contributes to the geographical arbitrariness of capital punishment
in America. The Article finds that Virginia’s experience
demonstrates the geographical arbitrariness of the contemporary
death penalty in two important ways. First, this Article examines
the localization of capital sentencing within Virginia. Capital
*
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sentencing and execution data show that as Virginia’s death
penalty declined, the practice was kept alive by a small minority of
prosecutors who had an unusual passion for death sentencing. In
its latter years, Virginia’s death penalty thus increasingly reflected
the unfettered discretion of local decisionmakers. Second, this
Article considers how Virginia’s abolition affected the national
landscape of the death penalty. The Article concludes that both
quantitively and qualitatively, the end of Virginia’s death penalty
supports a conclusion that capital punishment has become too
arbitrary to be constitutional.
Table of Contents
I.

Introduction ............................................................................... 2

II. The Constitutional Significance of Arbitrariness and
Unusualness in Capital Sentencing................................................ 4
III. Geographic Arbitrariness & Unusualness ............................. 12
IV. The Geography of the Declining Virginia Death Penalty ..... 19
V. The Geography of the Post-Virginia Death Penalty .............. 43
VI. Conclusion ............................................................................... 52
I. Introduction
Virginia’s death penalty ended with a slow but sustained
whimper. Although many people had worked for years to end death
sentences and executions in Virginia, few expected the movement
to gain the momentum necessary for legislative abolition in 2021.
But by the end of February, both of Virginia’s legislative bodies
had voted to abolish the death penalty in favor of life without
parole. And on March 24, 2021, Governor Ralph Northam signed
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abolition into law, calling it “the moral thing to do to end the death
penalty in the Commonwealth of Virginia[.]” 1
Much of the media coverage emphasized Virginia’s status as
the first southern state to abolish the death penalty. 2 The fact that
Virginia is a southern state is significant for several reasons. For
one, the legacy of the death penalty is intimately intertwined with
a history of racial terror and lynching. 3 Virginia was one of the
dozen states in which lynching was most prevalent, with 84
lynchings between 1877 and 1950. 4 Additionally, Virginia did not
approach its death penalty with dilettantism. On the contrary,
Virginia was the first colony to carry out an execution and was one
of the modern death penalty’s most active states. 5 In short,
Virginia was a true death state.
For many years before Virginia’s abolition, however, the
state’s death penalty had been in decline. By the time Virginia’s
abolition bill was signed into law, it had been almost a decade since
the state’s last new death sentence. That death sentence—imposed
on Mark Lawlor in Fairfax County in 2011—had been vacated by
1. See Whittney Evans, Virginia Governor Signs Law Abolishing the Death
Penalty, a 1st in the South, NPR (Mar. 24, 2021, 2:50 PM) (reporting on the
signing ceremony and its historical significance) [https://perma.cc/9QJR-5HXS].
As governor, Northam had not overseen any executions in Virginia. See generally
Ann Marimow, He’s a Killer Set to Die. But His Mental Illness Has Set Off a New
Death Penalty Battle., WASH. POST (June 24, 2017) [https://perma.cc/R3RX38ZM]. The last execution had been the 2017 lethal injection of William Morva, a
seriously mentally ill person who was denied clemency by Northam’s predecessor,
Governor Terry McAuliffe. Id. (describing Morva’s case, trial, and appeal).
2. See, e.g., Dakin Andone, Why Virginia’s Abolition of the Death Penalty is
a Big Deal for the State and the US, CNN (last updated Mar. 29, 2021, 7:56 AM)
(reporting that Virginia was “the first Southern state to” abolish, which “has great
import, not only for Virginia, but for the South and the rest of the country . . . .”)
[https://perma.cc/HYV7-3P6U]; Evans, supra note 1 (noting this status in
headline); Hailey Fuchs, Virginia Becomes First Southern State to Abolish the
Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES (last updated Jul. 22, 2021) (same)
[https://perma.cc/XWZ3-SRTU].
3. Critical research and thought on this issue are summarized and
developed in an Equal Justice Initiative report. See Lynching in America:
Confronting the Legacy of Racial Terror, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE (3d ed. 2017)
[https://perma.cc/K46B-DZGA].
4. See id. at Table 1 (comparing African American lynching victims).
5. See Virginia, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. [hereinafter “DPIC”]
(chronicling the history of the death penalty in Virginia) [https://perma.cc/WFE5BUDJ].
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the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2018. 6 As Virginia’s use of
the death penalty had decreased, its localized nature also had
become increasingly clear. Rather than reflecting the conscience of
the people of Virginia, the death penalty largely reflected the
appetites of a few local prosecutors in a handful of death-hungry
jurisdictions. And rather than reflecting the seriousness of the
crime or a defendant’s individual characteristics, Virginia’s death
sentences largely reflected geographic coincidence. In other words,
it was not the crime or the defendant that determined the use of
the death penalty; it was the jurisdiction in which the crime
happened to occur.
This article examines geographic arbitrariness through the
lens of Virginia’s experience with the modern death penalty. The
article proceeds in four parts. First, I discuss the constitutional
framework of arbitrariness and unusualness, and why these
concepts matter in the context of the modern death penalty. 7
Second, I discuss the concept of “geographical arbitrariness.” 8
Third, I describe the geography of Virginia’s death penalty and its
increasingly localized use prior to abolition. 9 Fourth, I discuss how
the abolition of Virginia’s death penalty has changed the
geography of the modern death penalty, making our national death
penalty even more unusual. 10 Along the way, this article exposes
some of the arbitrary factors that kept Virginia’s death penalty
alive even when it had become an anachronism.
II. The Constitutional Significance of Arbitrariness and
Unusualness in Capital Sentencing
America’s death penalty is primarily regulated by the Eighth
Amendment, which bars the infliction of “cruel and unusual

6. See Lawlor v. Zook, 909 F.3d 614 (4th Cir. 2018) (reversing district
court’s decision and remanding with instructions to grant relief).
7. See infra Part II (discussing the constitutional importance of
arbitrariness and unusualness in capital sentencing).
8. See infra Part III (explaining geographic arbitrariness and unusualness).
9. See infra Part IV (describing the geography of the declining Virginia
death penalty).
10. See infra Part V (providing an explanation of the geography of the postVirginia death penalty).
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punishments.” 11 Given our country’s long history of capital
punishment, the death penalty has never been held per se
unconstitutional. 12 Rather, the salient constitutional question has
been whether the application of the death penalty renders it cruel
and unusual. 13 In other words, the United States Supreme Court
has accepted the constitutionality of the death penalty as a type of
punishment but has regulated through the Eighth Amendment
how that punishment is applied. 14 Consequently, modern
American death penalty jurisprudence is fundamentally concerned
with the application of the death penalty, including capital
sentencing procedures, capital appeals, and post-conviction review
of death sentences.
The modern era of America’s death penalty was signaled in
1972, when the United States Supreme Court invalidated existing
capital sentencing schemes because they were wholly discretionary
and thus risked the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. 15
Justice Stewart famously described the death sentences at issue as
“cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning
is cruel and unusual.” 16 In particular, Stewart noted that the death
penalty was imposed upon “a capriciously selected random
handful” of people who had committed the same grave crimes. 17
Similarly, Justice White decried the fact that “the death penalty is
exacted with great infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes
11. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
12. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (“Fines, imprisonment and
even execution may be imposed depending upon the enormity of the crime, but
any technique outside the bounds of these traditional penalties is constitutionally
suspect.”).
13. See id. at 101 (“The Amendment must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”).
14. See id. at 100 (“While the State has the power to punish, the Amendment
stands to assure this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.”).
15. Each of the Furman justices wrote separately, meaning that the
narrowest concurrences state the Court’s holding. See Marks v. United States,
430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (providing that in a plurality opinion, the holding is the
position taken by the members of the court who concurred in the judgement on
the narrowest grounds). And those concurrences, by Justices Stewart and White,
emphasized the arbitrary nature of the death penalty at the time. See Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972) (per curiam).
16. Id. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
17. See id.
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and that there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few
cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is
not.” 18 In other words, the broadly discretionary death sentencing
schemes were unconstitutional because they permitted
unprincipled application that led to apparently random results.
The arbitrariness of the death penalty was suggested not only
by the randomness of the persons sentenced to death, but also by
the relative infrequency with which the death penalty was applied.
Justice Brennan noted that in the forty years between 1930 and
1970, execution rates had plummeted. 19 This low rate of death
sentences allowed for a strong inference “that the punishment is
not being regularly and fairly applied.” 20 Although the states could
argue that low rates of death sentencing reflected “informed
selectivity” rather than arbitrariness, very low rates made it
“highly implausible that only the worst criminals or the criminals
who commit the worst crimes are selected for this punishment.” 21
In other words, the unusualness of the death penalty was
indicative that it was being applied in an arbitrary manner.
Of course, arbitrariness and randomness are not the same
thing. Although Justice Brennan wrote that the death penalty
“smacks of little more than a lottery system,” some of the Justices
had a strong sense that the twentieth century death penalty did
follow a predictable pattern. 22 In particular, some members of the
Furman Court were concerned that discretionary sentencing
schemes opened the door not to true randomness, but to a death
penalty meted out on the basis of race. 23 But ultimately, Furman
18. See id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
19. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 291 (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting the
decline in executions by decade despite the increase in population and capital
crimes committed).
20. See id. at 291–93 (Brennan, J., concurring) (suggesting that when such
a populous country with so many capital crimes executes at most one person per
week, there is reason to question application of the punishment).
21. See id. at 293–94 (Brennan, J., concurring).
22. See id. (“No one has yet suggested a rational basis that could
differentiate in those terms the few who die from the many who go to prison.”).
23. Justice Douglas emphasized that the wholly discretionary nature of
existing capital sentencing statutes made them “pregnant with discrimination,”
particularly against the poor and against Black defendants. Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 254–57 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring). Similarly, Justice Marshall
wrote that the Court’s prior approval of unguided discretion in capital sentencing
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did not require that arbitrariness be the product of impermissible
discrimination to have constitutional significance. Rather, the
Court held that a death sentencing scheme that allows for the
arbitrary application of the death penalty is unconstitutional,
without reaching any conclusion as to the sources or causes of that
arbitrariness. 24
After Furman, hoping to save the death penalty from judicial
abolition, “at least 35 States . . . enacted new statutes that
provide[d] for the death penalty for at least some crimes that result
in the death of another person.” 25 In a set of 1976 companion
cases—Gregg v. Georgia 26, Proffitt v. Florida, 27 Jurek v. Texas, 28
Woodson v. North Carolina, 29 and Roberts v. Louisiana 30—the
Supreme Court considered a selection of capital sentencing
schemes that exemplified the various statutes enacted by the
states in response to Furman. 31 Stated broadly, these 1976 cases
established two fundamental requirements for modern capital
sentencing schemes. First, capital sentencers cannot exercise
unbridled discretion; rather, sentencing schemes must
appropriately guide and limit the discretion of capital sentencers. 32
“was an open invitation to discrimination.” Id. at 365 (Marshall, J., concurring).
In addition to racial discrimination, Marshall noted the disproportionate
application of the death penalty to men and not women, and to the poor and not
the privileged. Id. at 365–66.
24. Justice Stewart acknowledged that these concurrences “demonstrated
that, if any basis can be discerned for the selection of these few to be sentenced to
die, it is the constitutionally impermissible basis of race.” Id. at 310 (Stewart, J.,
concurring). He believed, however, that “racial discrimination has not been
proved” and thus he “put it to one side.” Id. Instead of reaching the underlying
causes, Stewart wrote, “I simply conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal
systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly
imposed.” Id.
25. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179–80 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(exploring whether society at large endorses the death penalty).
26. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
27. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
28. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
29. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
30. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
31. See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
32. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189–95 (limiting discretion to
minimize capricious and wholly arbitrary action); see also Proffitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242, 258 (1976) (“[T]he requirements of Furman are satisfied when the
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Second, capital sentencing schemes must permit individualized
consideration of the person convicted of a capital crime, rendering
mandatory death sentences (death sentences automatically
imposed upon conviction of a capital crime, without any
consideration of the individual defendant) unconstitutional. 33
In addition to addressing concerns about the death penalty’s
arbitrariness, Gregg and its companion cases responded to
Furman’s concern that the death penalty had become too unusual
(i.e., rare) to be anything but arbitrary. In fact, one of the key
factors motivating Gregg was a national movement towards
reinstating the death penalty. While the Court in Furman had
relied in part on diminishing support for the death penalty, the
Gregg Court noted that the majority of states quickly had enacted
new death penalty statutes in response to Furman’s concerns. 34
Moreover, continuing high rates of death sentences (254 between
Furman and 1974, and 460 between Furman and early 1976)
appeared to counter some of Furman’s concerns that the death

sentencing authority’s discretion is guided and channeled by requiring
examination of specific factors that argue in favor of or against imposition of the
death penalty, thus eliminating total arbitrariness and capriciousness in its
imposition.”); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 273–74 (1976) (“[A]s in Georgia and
Florida, the Texas capital-sentencing procedure guides and focuses the jury’s
objective consideration of the particularized circumstances of the individual
offense and the individual offender before it can impose a sentence of death.”).
Although these cases do not specify prerequisites for constitutional death penalty
schemes, they do provide guidance. See generally Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153; Proffitt,
428 U.S. at 242; Jurek, 428 U.S. at 262. Modern statutory schemes typically
include bifurcated guilt/innocence and sentencing proceedings, jury findings
(often in the form of aggravating factors) that narrow the class of persons eligible
for the death penalty, consideration of the capital defendant’s mitigating
evidence, and mandatory appellate review. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197.
33. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (“A process that
accords no significance to relevant facets of the character and records of the
individual offender or the circumstances of the particular offense excludes from
consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of death the possibility of
compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of
humankind.”); see also Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 335–36 (1976)
(similarly rejecting mandatory death sentences).
34. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179–80 (“The most marked indication of society’s
endorsement of the death penalty for murder is the legislative response to
Furman. The legislatures of at least 35 States have enacted new statutes that
provide for the death penalty for at least some crimes that result in the death of
another person.”).
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penalty was too unusual to be fair. 35 In other words, the states
seemed to respond to Furman’s concerns about rareness and
arbitrariness with a determination to make death sentences and
executions more commonplace.
These 1976 cases thus set the stage for the modern American
death penalty, a thicket of statutes and case law that purports to
achieve sound, replicable judgments of the individual worth of
complex human beings. After Gregg, capital sentencing statutes
generally incorporate a system of aggravating factors (facts
supporting a greater penalty) and mitigating factors (facts or
reasons supporting a lesser penalty). Aggravating factors are
elements of death-eligible capital murder and must be found by a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 36 In contrast, jurors need not be
unanimous in their assessments of an individual defendant’s
mitigation. 37 Theoretically, aggravating factors should guide
capital jurors to limit death penalty eligibility to the “worst”
offenses and persons, and mitigation should allow jurors to assess
the individuals convicted of those death-eligible crimes. This
system is intended to reflect the Supreme Court’s determination
“that in capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity
underlying the Eighth Amendment requires consideration of the
character and record of the individual offender and the
circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally
indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of
death.” 38

35. See id. at 181–82 (providing capital punishment sentences from 1974 to
1976).
36. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 585–86 (2002) (holding that any fact
that increases the maximum punishment—including an aggravating factor that
makes a capital defendant eligible for the death penalty—must be found by a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt); see also Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92, 94 (2016)
(finding unconstitutional Florida system in which the jury made a sentencing
recommendation but the judge made findings of aggravation). But see McKinney
v. Arizona, 140 S. Ct. 702, 709 (2020) (allowing state appellate courts to reweigh
aggravating and mitigating circumstances in collateral proceedings).
37. See Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 384 (1988) (acknowledging that a
juror unanimity requirement for mitigation would violate the principle that “the
sentencer must be permitted to consider all mitigating evidence.”); McKoy v.
North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990) (finding North Carolina’s jury unanimity
requirement for mitigating evidence unconstitutional).
38. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (citation omitted).
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Whether these new sentencing schemes would eliminate
arbitrary outcomes, however, remained to be seen. In the forty-five
years since Gregg, the United States Supreme Court frequently
has revisited issues of arbitrariness in capital sentencing as a
variety of arbitrariness challenges have reached the Court. For
example, vagueness challenges to aggravating factors have arisen
when the factors that are supposed to identify the “worst” offenses
“fail adequately to channel the sentencing decision patterns of
juries with the result that a pattern of arbitrary and capricious
sentencing like that found unconstitutional in Furman could
occur.” 39 Categorical exclusion cases have found whole classes of
persons or crimes ineligible for the death penalty, occasionally
referring to the arbitrariness of a death sentence for certain crimes
or people. 40 For a time, the Court held that victim impact
testimony was usually inadmissible in capital cases due to the
“impermissible risk that the capital sentencing decision will be
made in an arbitrary manner.” 41 Perhaps most famously, in 1987,
the Court declined to find Georgia’s capital sentencing scheme
unconstitutional despite strong evidence that the death penalty
was being administered on the basis of the most pernicious
arbitrary factor: race. 42
39. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 n.46 (1976). Examples of this type of challenge
include Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (finding Georgia’s vileness
aggravating factor unconstitutional when it was too vague to “impl[y] any
inherent restraint on the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty.”)
and Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967 (1994) (holding that three aggravating
factors challenged in the California system were not unconstitutionally vague).
40. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 439 (2008) (“We find it
difficult to identify standards that would guide the decisionmaker so the penalty
is reserved for the most severe cases of child rape and yet not imposed in an
arbitrary way.”).
41. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 504 (1987), overruled by Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991) (“[T]he Booth Court was wrong in stating
that this kind of evidence leads to the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.
In the majority of cases . . . victim impact evidence serves entirely legitimate
purposes.”).
42. See generally McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). But see id. at 320
(Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, & Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (pointing to a terrible
history of the Supreme Court upholding racist laws, including in Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 15 L. Ed. 691 (1857) and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896)).
Philosopher Hugo Bedau opined that “historians will look back on McCleskey and
judge it to be yet another of the court’s great failures—along with Dred Scott,
Plessy, Korematsu and Hirabyashi.” Hugo Adam Bedau, Someday McCleskey Will
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In sum, the concepts of arbitrariness and unusualness—as
well as the risk of arbitrariness—have great constitutional
significance in death penalty law. One of the foundational
constitutional principles of the modern death penalty is that
capital sentencing schemes must eliminate the risk of
arbitrariness in death penalty decision making. 43 Consistent with
that principle, one of the basic premises of the modern death
penalty is that capital sentencing schemes—including statutory
definitions of capital murder, special sentencing procedures for
capital cases, evidentiary rules, and appellate review—can
eliminate the risk of arbitrariness. 44 In other words, it is a
fundamental assumption of our contemporary death penalty
jurisprudence that arbitrary death sentences can be eliminated at
the statutory level. For the most part, this risk management must
occur at the state level, 45 where each individual jurisdiction crafts
its own statutes, procedures, and evidentiary rules.
be Death Penalty’s Dred Scott, L.A. TIMES (May 1, 1987) [https://perma.cc/9DGS9K9R]. For an insightful contemporary examination of McCleskey and the
underlying data that supported a challenge to Georgia’s racist death penalty, see
Scott Phillips & Justin Marceau, Whom the State Kills, 55 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV
585 (2020).
43. See Constitutionality of the Death Penalty in America, DPIC (discussing
arbitrariness and eliminating sentencing disparities within Supreme Court cases
regarding the suspension and reinstatement of capital punishment)
[https://perma.cc/4EA4-BRGX].
44. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 325–26, 334, 337 (1976)
(discussing safeguards against arbitrariness).
45. Of course, the federal government also has a death penalty, but the vast
majority of contemporary death sentences and executions occur at the state level.
In the modern era, only sixteen people have been executed by the federal
government. Thirteen were executed in an unusual surge between July 14, 2020,
and January 16, 2021, by the Trump administration. See Executions Under the
Federal Death Penalty, DPIC [https://perma.cc/R8UP-KEB2]. This aberrant
federal execution activity exemplified political use of the death penalty. See, e.g.,
Michael Tarm & Michael Balsamo, Trump Ratchets up Pace of Executions Before
Biden Inaugural, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 7, 2020) (“Critics have said the restart
of executions in an election year was politically motivated, helping Trump burnish
his claim that he is a law-and-order president.”) [https://perma.cc/9KCP-9EF8];
see also Jean Marbella, Amid Pandemic and Trump’s Final Chaotic Days, A
Maryland Man with COVID-19 Fights His Upcoming Federal Execution, BALT.
SUN (Jan. 9, 2021) (“The number of people executed in the U.S. has been on about
a two-decade decline. A total of 17 people were executed in 2020, including the 10
federally . . . but Trump has long and vocally supported the death penalty.”)
[https://perma.cc/NR4L-994A].
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III. Geographic Arbitrariness & Unusualness

As the above discussion conveys, the constitutionality of the
modern American death penalty hinges on whether it actually
eliminates the arbitrary, unusual imposition of death sentences.
Additionally, the death penalty is “unusual” for constitutional
purposes when it is imposed on a “capriciously selected random
handful” rather than the “worst of the worst.” 46 In the last twenty
years, however, the death penalty has become increasingly
unusual in this country. The contemporary death penalty is a local
one: limited to certain states, and heavily practiced only within
specific jurisdictions within those states. 47 As result, one of the
single greatest factors in whether a person will face the death
penalty is not who they are, or what they did, but where they did
it. This localization begs an obvious question: can a system in
which geography plays such a critical role truly be ensuring that
the death penalty is conferred upon the select few who both have
the worst characters and records, and have committed the worst
crimes?
Concern for geographic disparities in death sentencing figured
prominently in Justices Breyer’s and Ginsburg’s high-profile
dissent in Glossip v. Gross. 48 The Glossip dissent, which concluded
that the death penalty is likely unconstitutional, ignited concern
about the continuing arbitrariness of the death penalty and the
failure of modern death sentencing schemes to cure the
constitutional infirmities noted in Furman. 49 The dissent
46. See Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 206 (2006) (Souter, Stevens,
Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568
(2005)) (noting that “within the category of capital crimes, the death penalty must
be reserved for ‘the worst of the worst’”).
47. See State by State, DPIC (reporting which states do and do not maintain
capital punishment) [https://perma.cc/8KLC-VBN5].
48. See generally Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863 (2015) (Breyer & Sotomayor,
JJ., dissenting).
49. See, e.g., Lincoln Caplan, Richard Glossip and the End of the Death
Penalty, THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 30, 2015) (noting that Justice Scalia opined after
the Glossip dissent that he “wouldn’t be surprised” if the United States Supreme
Court rules the death penalty unconstitutional) [https://perma.cc/ABU7-MTCT];
Scott Lemiuex, Why the American Death Penalty System is Broken, THE WEEK
(Oct. 5, 2015) (“‘Glossip is likely to be executed because capital punishment
enhances prosecutorial power to secure unreliable and arbitrary death sentences.’
This is simply not a system that can be defended. It is becoming increasingly
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emphasized that since Gregg “circumstances and the evidence of
the death penalty’s application have changed radically.” 50
Specifically, there was by then forty years of evidence that the
Gregg solution had failed, including evidence of continued
arbitrariness and the death penalty’s national decline:
In 1976, the Court thought that the constitutional infirmities in
the death penalty could be healed; the Court in effect delegated
significant responsibility to the States to develop procedures
that would protect against those constitutional problems.
Almost 40 years of studies, surveys, and experience strongly
indicate, however, that this effort has failed. Today’s
administration of the death penalty involves three fundamental
constitutional defects: (1) serious unreliability, (2) arbitrariness
in application, and (3) unconscionably long delays that
undermine the death penalty’s penological purposes. Perhaps
as a result, (4) most places within the United States have
abandoned its use. 51

Since Gregg, the United States Supreme Court tried “to make
the application of the death penalty less arbitrary by restricting its
use to . . . ’the worst of the worst.’” 52 Instead, the Glossip dissenters
noted, the death penalty has continued to be “imposed arbitrarily,
i.e., without the ‘reasonable consistency’ legally necessary to
reconcile its use with the Constitution’s commands.” 53 Rather than
being imposed on the basis of proper factors such as “comparative
egregiousness of the crime,” death sentences are imposed on the
basis of factors “that ought not . . . affect application of the death
penalty, such as race, gender, or geography . . . .” 54
difficult to disagree with Justice Breyer’s conclusion in June that the death
penalty is categorically unconstitutional.”) [https://perma.cc/CL5L-EYRA]; Tom
Randall, A Halted Execution and the Future of the Death Penalty, BLOOMBERG
(Sept. 30, 2015) (focusing on Breyer’s argument that the death penalty has
become unconstitutionally unusual) [https://perma.cc/7FWC-49BF].
50. Glossip, 576 U.S. at 909.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 916 (quoting Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 206 (Souter, J.,
dissenting)) (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005)) (“Capital
punishment must be limited to those offenders who commit a narrow category of
the most serious crimes and whose extreme culpability makes them the most
deserving of execution.”); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008) (citing
Roper, 543 U.S. at 568)).
53. Id. at 917 (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982)).
54. Id. at 918 (second emphasis added).
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The focus of the Glossip dissenters on the geography of the
death penalty was novel to the Court’s jurisprudence. The
dissenters observed that “[g]eography . . . plays an important role
in determining who is sentenced to death.” 55 This is not, however,
“simply because some States permit the death penalty while others
do not. Rather within a death penalty State, the imposition of the
death penalty heavily depends on the county in which a defendant
is tried.” 56 Justices Breyer and Ginsburg set forth some of the data
on the increasing geographic disparity of the death penalty,
emphasizing the role of individual counties within a state:
Between 2004 and 2009, for example, just 29 counties (fewer
than 1% of counties in the country) accounted for approximately
half of all death sentences imposed nationwide. What accounts
for this county-by-county disparity? Some studies indicate that
the disparity reflects the decisionmaking authority, the legal
discretion, and ultimately the power of the local prosecutor.
Other suggest that the availability of resources for defense
counsel (or the lack thereof) helps explain geographical
differences. Still others indicate that the racial composition of
and distribution within a county plays an important role.
Finally, some studies suggest that political pressures, including
pressures on judges who must stand for election, can make a
difference . . . . The research strongly suggests that the death
penalty is imposed arbitrarily. 57

The Glossip dissenters noted that this geographical
arbitrariness is also reflected in their judicial experience, which
included inexplicable disparities in the types of cases that are
prosecuted as death cases, as well as the types of defendants whom
certain prosecutors seek to execute. 58
55. Id. (citing Steven Shatz & Terry Dalton, Challenging the Death Penalty
with Statistics: Furman, McCleskey, and a Single County Case Study, 34 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1227, 1253–56 (2013)).
56. Id. (citing Robert Smith, The Geography of the Death Penalty and its
Ramifications, 92 B.U. L. REV. 227, 231–32 (2012); John Donohue, An Empirical
Evaluation of the Connecticut Death Penalty System Since 1973, Are There
Unlawful Racial, Gender, and Geographic Disparities?, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 637, 673 (2014)) (emphasis added).
57. Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 919–20 (2015).
58. See id. at 923 (“[W]hy does one defendant who participated in a singlevictim murder-for-hire scheme . . . receive the death penalty, while another
defendant does not, despite having stabbed his wife 60 times and killed
his . . . daughter and . . . son while they slept? In each instance, the sentences
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Thus, one of the ways in which the death penalty has become
arbitrary is that geography now plays a central role in determining
who receives death sentences. But, as Breyer explains, this
geographic disparity is not a function of legislative
decisionmaking, as evidenced by the fact that disparate sentences
are imposed within single states under the same statutory
regime. 59 Rather, it is a function of decisionmaking at the county
level, where it is nearly impossible to eliminate arbitrariness. In
other words, even within a death penalty state that has a single
capital sentencing scheme, disparities in death sentences and
executions persist at the county level. Not all counties seek death
sentences, and not all counties pursue capital prosecutions to
execution. As the Glossip dissenters suggested, there may be many
reasons at play, including race and indigent defense resources. 60
But one of the factors is certainly prosecutorial discretion, as
individual prosecutors vary widely in their appetites for death, and
there is little restraint on their broad charging power. 61
As this discussion in Glossip exemplifies, geographic
disparities could result in unconstitutional arbitrariness. But the
Glossip dissent explains that geographic disparities are also
important for another reason––they are proof the death penalty
has become unconstitutionally “unusual.” 62 As discussed in Part
compared were imposed in the same State at about the same time”) (emphasis
added).
59. See id. at 918 (explaining that geography plays an important role in
determining who is sentenced to death, not because some States permit the death
penalty while others do not, but because within death penalty States, the
imposition of the death penalty heavily depends on the county in which a
defendant is tried).
60. See id. at 919 (“[T]he racial composition of and distribution within a
county plays an important role.”).
61. See id. at 921 (noting that the Gregg “Court believed it possible to
interpret the Eighth Amendment in ways that would significantly limit the
arbitrary application of the death sentence,” but stating that “no longer seems
likely” as “[t]he Constitution does not prohibit the use of prosecutorial
discretion.”); see also id. at 922 (citing Timothy Kaufman-Osborn, Capital
Punishment, Proportionality Review, and Claims of Fairness (with Lessons from
Washington State), 79 WASH. L. REV. 775, 791–92 (2004)) (explaining how
systemic issues and biases continue to permeate the administration of the death
penalty, and “it seems unlikely that appeals can prevent the arbitrariness”
observed by the Justices).
62. Id. at 944.
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II, 63 the Constitution “forbids punishments that are cruel and
unusual.” 64 One of the concerns enunciated in Furman was that
although the death penalty was not historically unusual, it had
become unusual in modern times. 65 But state legislatures
responded strongly to Furman by enacting new death penalty
statutes, a shift that was important to the decision in Gregg. 66 By
the time of Glossip, the dissenters argued, the tides had again
shifted, this time in opposition to the death penalty. 67
Between 1976 and 2015, the death penalty had declined
significantly and become increasingly unusual in this country. 68
The Glossip dissenters pointed out that there were 137 death
sentences in 1977 and only seventy-three in 2014. 69 At the same
time, the total annual number of executions had fallen. 70
Furthermore, there was a consistent direction of change towards
death penalty abolition, with an increasing number of states
abolishing the death penalty and no state reinstating it within the
forty years between Gregg and Glossip. 71 In 2014, for example, only
seven states carried out a total of thirty-five executions, while only

63. See discussion supra Part II (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VIII) (“America’s
death penalty is primarily regulated by the Eighth Amendment, which bars the
infliction of ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’”).
64. Id. at 938.
65. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 291 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (noting “a steady decline in the infliction of this punishment”).
66. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179–81 (1976) (“The most marked
indication of society’s endorsement of the death penalty for murder is the
legislative response to Furman . . . . the post-Furman statutes make clear that
capital punishment itself has not been rejected by the elected representatives of
the people.”).
67. See Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 943 (2015) (reasoning that recent
trends “reflect the fact that a majority of Americans, when asked to choose
between the death penalty and life in prison without parole, now choose the
latter”).
68. See id. at 938–39 (“[I]n the last two decades, the imposition and
implementation of the death penalty have increasingly become unusual.”).
69. See id. at 939 (noting the general decline of new death sentences
imposed).
70. See id.
71. See id. at 939–40 (“Accordingly, 30 States have either formally abolished
the death penalty or have not conducted an execution in more than eight years.”).
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seventy-three persons were sentenced to death. 72 In comparison,
279 people were sentenced to death and ninety-eight executed only
fifteen years earlier in 1999. 73
In addition to numbers of death sentences and executions, the
Glossip dissenters looked to the localization of the death penalty to
quantify its unusualness. 74 The dissenters noted that “the number
of active death penalty States ha[d] fallen dramatically” since
Furman, when forty-one states permitted the death penalty and
there were only nine abolition states. 75 At the time of Glossip,
nineteen states had abolished the death penalty, and another
eleven had death penalty statutes but had not executed a single
person in nearly a decade. 76 The dissenters further noted that nine
states had executed fewer than five people in the eight years before
Glossip, “making an execution in those States a fairly rare
event.” 77 Thus, the dissenters concluded, there were only “11
States in which it is fair to say that capital punishment is not
‘unusual.’” 78 “And just three of those States accounted for 80% of
the executions nationwide (28 of the 35) in 2014”, and only four
other states executed people. 79 The dissent noted that thus “in 43
States, no one was executed.” 80 This included Virginia, described
as one of the “States most associated with the death penalty,”
where the dissenters noted a “dramatic decline[]” in executions. 81

72. See id. at 939 (reporting the numbers of persons executed and sentenced
to death in 2014).
73. See id. (reporting the numbers of persons executed and sentenced to
death in 1999).
74. See id. (Breyer & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (“Often when deciding
whether a punishment practice is, constitutionally speaking, “unusual,” this
Court has looked to the number of States engaging in that practice.”).
75. See id. at 939–40 (reporting the decline in States that permit the death
penalty, indicating that the practice is becoming more unusual).
76. See id. at 940 (citing State by State, DPIC (“As of today, 19 States have
abolished the death penalty (along with the District of Columbia) . . . In 11 other
States that maintain the death penalty on the books, no execution has taken place
for more than eight years[.]”) [https://perma.cc/8KLC-VBN5]).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See id. (“Indeed, last year, only seven States conducted an execution.”).
80. Id. at 941.
81. See id. at 943 (“[D]ramatic declines are present in Virginia[.]”).
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Given the decline in death penalty activity, county-by-county
disparities had become important not only to the arbitrariness of
the death penalty, but also its unusualness:
[T]he death penalty has become increasingly concentrated
geographically. County-by-county figures are relevant, for
decisions to impose the death penalty typically take place at a
county level. County-level sentencing figures show that,
between 1973 and 1997, 66 of America’s 3,143 counties
accounted for approximately 50% of all death sentences
imposed. By the early 2000’s, the death penalty was only
actively practiced in a very small number of counties: between
2004 and 2009, only 35 counties imposed 5 or more death
sentences, i.e., approximately one per year. And more recent
data show that the practice has diminished yet further: between
2010 and 2015 (as of June 22), only 15 counties imposed five or
more death sentences. In short, the number of active death
penalty counties is small and getting smaller. And the overall
statistics on county-level executions bear this out. Between 1976
and 2007, there were no executions in 86% of America’s
counties. 82

In sum, the Glossip dissenters set forth a powerful argument
that the contemporary geography of the American 83 death penalty
rendered it unconstitutional in two ways. One, the localization of
the death penalty within states means that persons are being
sentenced to death and executed based on an arbitrary factor: the
county in which they are prosecuted. Although many forces could
be involved in county-by-county disparities—including defense
resources, racial discrimination, and the identity and politics of
specific prosecutors or judges—the arbitrary result is the same.
Two, when the number of states and counties using the death
penalty decline, the penalty becomes increasingly unusual in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. As discussed in more detail

82. Id. at 941 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
83. See id. at 944 (noting foreign nations that have abolished the death
penalty by law or through practice, but relying “primarily upon domestic, not
foreign events, in pointing to changes and circumstances that tend of justify the
claim that the death penalty, constitutionally speaking, is unusual.”).
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below, 84 the decline and abolition of Virginia’s death penalty
powerfully illustrates both points.
IV. The Geography of the Declining Virginia Death Penalty
In 2015, inspired by the Glossip dissent, I wrote a motion to
bar the death penalty in a Virginia case due to its geographically
arbitrary and unusual prosecution, selection, and imposition. 85
The motion was filed in a capital case in Prince William County,
one of Virginia’s most active death penalty jurisdictions. 86 The case
was prosecuted by special prosecutors from Fairfax County,
another active death penalty county. The motion argued that being
prosecuted capitally or sentenced to death in Virginia depended
largely on a single arbitrary factor—the county of prosecution. 87
Unsurprisingly, the trial court did not find Virginia’s death
penalty unconstitutional. 88 But the abolition of Virginia’s death
penalty provides us with an opportunity to examine retrospectively
the geography of Virginia’s death penalty and county-by-county
disparities in its use.
Many analyses of the geography of the death penalty focus on
differences between America and the rest of the world, as well as
differences between the states. 89 But in their important 2011
84. See discussion infra Parts IV–V (outlining the disparities that arise in
the imposition of the death penalty based on geography and how the decline in
States imposing the death penalty contributes to those disparities).
85. See generally Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863 (2015) (Breyer & Sotomayor,
JJ., dissenting).
86. See Rachel Weiner, Study: Prince William, Fairfax Among Counties That
Account for Majority of U.S. Executions, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2013) (discussing
that the rate of executions in Prince William County places it among one of the
deadliest counties in the U.S.) [https://perma.cc/Q5AD-3J8B].
87. See generally Defendant’s Motion to Bar Imposition of the Death Penalty
(2015) (filed on behalf of a capital defendant in Prince William County).
88. See id.
89. See James Liebman & Peter Clarke, Minority Practice, Majority’s
Burden: The Death Penalty Today, 9 OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. 255, 259–60 (2011)
(citing DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN AN
AGE OF ABOLITION 11 (2010)) (noting that “[t]he historical, political, demographic,
and other explanations . . . offered for differences in the use of the death penalty”
have tended to be focused on differences between states, “for example, on States
that did and did not practice slavery, join the Confederacy, or tolerate lynching.”);
see also FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 72–78 (2003) (treating States and regional groupings of States as
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article—relied upon by the dissenters in Glossip 90— Professor
James S. Liebman and Peter Clarke conducted a county-by-county
analysis of America’s death penalty, demonstrating “that the
modern American death penalty is a distinctly minority practice
across the United States and in most or all of the thirty-four socalled death penalty States.” 91 In a revealing example, the authors
pointed out that as of 2011, almost two-thirds of Texas counties
had not carried out an execution in the previous thirty-five years,
notwithstanding Texas’s reputation as the “Death Penalty Capital
of the Western World.” 92 Because of these county-by-county
disparities, the authors concluded, “state-focused commentary
misses important facets of the death penalty’s localism.” 93
Although Virginia was not the focus of Liebman’s and Clarke’s
work, the Commonwealth was no exception to this rule. The
authors noted that between 1996 and 2011, new death sentences
had declined every year except one. 94 And because of this decline,
between 2004 and 2011, Virginia had executed nearly twice as
many people as received new death sentences. 95
Although “Virginia has long been thought of as a death
penalty heavyweight,” as of 2011, “Virginia ha[d] moved from
being a moderate death-sentencing state to being a marginal
death-sentencing state.” 96 In other words, ten years before
the key unit of analysis); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, A Tale of Two
Nations: Implementation of the Death Penalty in “Executing” Versus “Symbolic”
States in the United States, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1869, 1879 (2006) (noting that the
United States is not monolithic in its death penalty practices and dividing the
nation into “abolitionist” states, “symbolic” states, and “executing” states).
90. See Glossip, 576 U.S. at 919, 941 (relying on the findings of Liebman and
Clarke to conclude that local geography plays an important role in determining
who is sentenced to death) (citing Liebman & Clarke, supra note 89 at 265–66,
274, and n.47).
91. Liebman & Clarke, supra note 89, at 263.
92. Id. at 261 (citing David Michael Smith, The Death Penalty Capital of the
Western World, 13 PEACE REV. 495 (2011)).
93. Id.
94. See id. at 329 (explaining the general decline of new death sentences
since 1996).
95. See id. at 329 n.376 (noting that Virginia is among the small number of
states where the annual number of executions has exceeded annual new death
sentences) (citations omitted).
96. See id. at 334 & n.397 (providing evidence that many counties did not
use the death penalty, while many others employed it only sparingly).
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abolition, Virginia already had become a declining death penalty
state.
In the decade between 2011 and abolition, this trend became
only stronger. Between 1980 and 1990, for example, Virginia had
executed eleven people. 97 Between 1991 and 2000—the dark ages
of Virginia’s death penalty—the Commonwealth executed seventy
people. 98 And in its penultimate decade, between 2001 and 2010,
Virginia executed another twenty-seven people. 99 But, as
mentioned above, 2011 was the year of Virginia’s last new death
sentence, and that sentence was vacated by the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals in 2018. 100 In its last decade, Virginia executed a
total of five people, a number in stark contrast to the other decades
of Virginia’s modern death penalty era. 101 Due to both Virginia’s
relatively fast execution pace and the decline in new death
sentences, there were only two men (Anthony Juniper and Thomas
Porter) on death row at the time of abolition. 102
As Virginia’s death penalty declined, it became increasingly
localized. In 2013, the Death Penalty Information Center released
a report demonstrating that just two percent of counties had been
responsible for more than half of executions in the modern death
penalty era (i.e., since Gregg). 103 That report, cited by the Glossip
97. See Death Sentences in the United States Since 1977, DPIC (providing
the total number of people that Virginia has executed since 1977)
[https://perma.cc/EW7N-TBVW].
98. See id. (compiling the number of people executed per year in Virginia
between 1991 and 2000).
99. See id. (noting that Virginia did not carry out the first execution of its
modern era until 1982).
100. See Lawlor v. Zook 909 F.3d 614, 635 (4th Cir. 2018) (plurality opinion)
(quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (“‘When the choice is between
life and death, th[e] risk [that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors
which may call for a less severe penalty] is unacceptable and incompatible with
the commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.’”).
101. See DPIC, supra note 97 (compiling the number of people who were
executed in Virginia between 2010 and 2020).
102. See Museum Receives Virginia’s Implements of Execution, CBS 19 NEWS
(Jan. 15, 2022) (acknowledging that then-Governor Ralph Northam commuted
the death sentences of Thomas Porter and Anthony Juniper)
[https://perma.cc/78S5-52WB].
103. See, e.g., Richard C. Dieter, The 2% Death Penalty: How a Minority of
Counties Produce Most Death Cases at Enormous Costs to All, DPIC, at 1 (Oct.
2013) (stressing that “since the reinstatement of the death penalty in 1976, Texas
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dissenters, 104 noted that “[j]ust four states (Texas, Virginia,
Oklahoma, and Florida) ha[d] been responsible for almost 60% of
the executions.” 105 But the disparities were most striking at the
county level. In fact, at the time, the vast majority of counties
nationwide were not responsible for anyone currently on death
row, and eighty-five percent “ha[d]not had a single person executed
in over 45 years.” 106
In other words, capital punishment had not been evenly
spread across these death penalty states; it had been concentrated
in certain local jurisdictions. For example, four Texas counties
were responsible for nearly half of the state’s executions, and three
California counties were responsible for over half of that state’s
death sentences. 107 Two percent of counties nationwide accounted
for not only the majority of executions (693 of 1,320), but also the
majority of persons then living on death row (1,755 of 3,125). 108
These were not, however, necessarily the same two percent of
counties.
Although Virginia’s use of the death penalty had been
declining overall, Virginia was still well-represented in the two
percent of counties that accounted for the majority of executions
since 1976. In fact, seven Virginia counties—Prince William (9),
Chesterfield (8), Virginia Beach City (8), Fairfax (5), Hampton City
(5), Pittsylvania (5), and Portsmouth City (5)—made the list. 109
Given that sixty-two counties made the list, Virginia accounted for

alone has accounted for 38% of the nation’s executions”) [https://perma.cc/CF5SK8HY].
104. Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 919 (2015) (Breyer & Ginsburg, JJ.,
dissenting).
105. Dieter, supra note 103, at 4.
106. Id. at 1.
107. See id. at 5 (providing examples of local jurisdictions within particular
states that are responsible for the majority of the executions and death sentences
in the United States).
108. See id. at 6 & n.17–18 (demonstrating that high population counts did
not explain the disparity because “these counties represent[ed] only 15.9% of the
U.S. population (execution counties) or 24.7% of U.S. population (death row
counties)”).
109. See id. app. at 27–28 (organizing data in a table of the two percent of
counties responsible for 52% of the death penalty executions since 1976).
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slightly over eleven percent of these avid death penalty
jurisdictions. 110
But no Virginia county made the list of sixty-two counties
accounting for fifty-six percent of the death row population. 111 By
the 2013 publication of the DPIC’s report, Virginia had not
imposed a new death sentence in several years. At the same time,
Virginia had executed almost one hundred people between 1991
and 2010. 112 As a result, Virginia’s death row population had
dwindled by 2013, and no Virginia county was responsible for
many persons on death row. 113 After the DPIC report, Virginia’s
executions continued to decline. 114 Between the close of the DPIC’s
data set in 2012 and abolition, there were four executions in
Virginia: Robert Gleason in 2013, Alfredo Prieto in 2015, and Ricky
Gray and William Morva in 2017. 115 Only one of these four men,
Mr. Prieto, had been sentenced to death in one of the seven most
active execution counties (Fairfax). 116
Of course, it should be noted that executions are not the only
measure of death penalty activity. Execution and death sentence
totals may vary greatly, and the reasons for this are likely
complex. 117 (To offer one example that deserves attention, there is
“a strong correlation between the prolific application of the death
penalty and the high percentage of cases being reversed on

110. See id.
111. See id. app. at 29–30 (creating a table of the two percent of counties
responsible for 56% of the individuals sentenced on death row).
112. See Liliana Segura, The Long Shadow of Virginia’s Death Penalty, THE
INTERCEPT (last updated Apr. 11, 2021) (describing Virginia’s complicated history
with the death penalty) [https://perma.cc/TXK7-K7SL].
113. See id. (illustrating how executions in Virginia declined around 2013).
114. See id. (compiling the executions that have taken place in Virginia since
the DPIC’s report from 2013).
115. See id. (highlighting the most recent executions that have taken place in
Virginia).
116. See id. (stating that Alfredo R. Prieto was executed in Fairfax County in
2015); see also Weiner, supra note 86 (establishing that Fairfax County, Virginia
is one locality that accounted for a significant number of executions based on a
study from 2013) [https://perma.cc/ZCA4-39TB].
117. See Death Penalty in 2021: Year End Report, DPIC (Dec. 16, 2021)
(showing the number of death sentences and executions each year in the United
States) [https://perma.cc/8G43-SB5E].
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appeal.” 118) Thus, looking at the rate of executions does not tell us
everything about county-by-county activity. 119 For example,
between 1977–2004, Arlington County and Danville each were
responsible for eight death sentences and Richmond was
responsible for thirteen. 120 But none of these jurisdictions were
included in the two percent of counties that accounted for the
majority of executions between 1976 and 2012. 121 The story of
these jurisdictions’ involvement in Virginia’s death penalty is an
important one—since a just system is concerned not only with
executions, but also with death sentencing—but that issue is
outside the scope of this article. 122
The seven Virginia counties included in the nation’s two
percent of death penalty jurisdictions declined at different
times. 123 But most of the counties were active in the 1990s—the
heyday of Virginia’s death penalty—and fell off afterwards. 124 For
example, although Virginia Beach was responsible for six
executions in the 1990s, it was responsible for only two after 1997,

118. Dieter, supra note 103, at 19.
119. See Execution Database, DPIC (outlining the number of executions
performed based on factors like year, state, age, etc.) [https://perma.cc/G5D6V2TU].
120. See Brandon L. Garrett, The Decline of the Virginia (and American)
Death Penalty, 105 GEO. L.J. 661, 717–18 (2017) (establishing the number of
death sentences in different counties in Virginia between 1977 and 2004).
121. Between 1976 and the abolition of the death penalty in Virginia,
Arlington County was responsible for three executions (Michael Satcher in 1997,
Angel Breard in 1998, and Christopher Beck in 2001). Richmond City was also
responsible for three executions (Linwood Briley and James Briley, also known
as “the Briley Brothers,” in 1984 and 1985, respectively, and Ricky Gray in 2017).
In addition, Danville City was responsible for three executions (Johnny Watkins
in 1994, Dana Edmonds in 1995, and Christopher Scott Emmett in 2008).
Richmond County was responsible for four executions (Timothy Spencer in 1994,
Ronald Bennett in 1996, Eric Payne in 1999, and Christopher Goins in 2000). See
Execution Database, supra note 119 (compiling the executions that have occurred
in Arlington County, Danville, and Richmond from 1973 to present day).
122. See id. (establishing the executions that have taken place not only by
state, but also by county, highlighting jurisdictional differences).
123. See Dieter, supra note 103, at 27–28 (listing the two percent of counties
that were responsible for fifty-two percent of executions since 1976, including
seven Virginia counties).
124. See Execution Database, supra note 119 (highlighting the number of
executions that took place in Virginia in the 1990s in various counties).
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and both of those occurred in 2000. 125 The last execution
attributable to Pittsylvania County was that of Teresa Lewis, who
was executed in 2010. 126 But before then, Pittsylvania had not been
responsible for an execution since the 1999 death of Ronald Yeatts,
and Pittsylvania’s other three executions had been carried in 1997
and 1998. 127 Similarly, only one of Portsmouth City’s five
executions occurred after 1999, the 2006 death of Dexter Vinson. 128
The same is true of Chesterfield County. 129 Although Chesterfield
was responsible for eight executions, only one occurred after 1999,
the 2006 execution of John Schmitt. 130 And Hampton City followed
a similar pattern, with four executions in the 1990s and a final one
in 2004. 131
The two other counties that made the DPIC’s two percent of
execution counties—Prince William County and Fairfax County—
125. This data was derived from the DPIC’s Execution Database, which is
searchable by state. See id. The persons executed under Virginia Beach City death
sentences were Albert Clozza in 1991, Andrew Chabrol in 1993, David Pruett in
1993, Richard Townes in 1996, Joseph O’Dell in 1997, Mario Murphy in 1997,
Michael Clagett in 2000, and Russel Burkett in 2000. Id.
126. See id. (showing the last execution that took place pursuant to a
Pittsylvania County death sentence when searching the database by state).
127. See id. (acknowledging the individuals who were executed under
Pittsylvania County death sentences when using the state filter and searching
executions in Virginia). The five persons executed pursuant to Pittsylvania
County death sentences were Roy Smith in 1997, Ronald Watkins in 1998, Ronald
Fitzgerald in 1998, Ronald Yeatts in 1999, and Teresa Lewis in 2010. Id.
128. See id. (listing the individuals who were executed under Portsmouth
City death sentences). The five men whose executions were attributable to
Portsmouth City were Richard Boggs in 1990, Coleman Gray in 1997, Carlton
Pope in 1997, Jason Joseph in 1999, and Dexter Vinson in 2006. Id.
129. See id. (establishing the number of executions attributable to various
counties in Virginia when searching the database by state).
130. See id. (identifying the individuals who were executed pursuant to
Chesterfield County death sentences). The eight men executed under Chesterfield
County death sentences were Edward Fitzgerald in 1992, Charles Stamper in
1993, Mark Sheppard in 1999, Tony Fry in 1999, George Quesinberry in 1999,
Everett Mueller in 1999, Andre Graham in 1999, and John Schmitt in 2006. A
striking five of fourteen Virginia executions in 1999 were attributable to
Chesterfield County alone. Id.
131. See id. (identifying the executions that took place pursuant to Hampton
City death sentences when using the state filter to find executions in Virginia).
Hampton City was responsible for the executions of Derick Peterson in 1991,
Herman Barnes in 1995, Thomas Beavers in 1997, Thomas Royal in 1999, and
Mark Bailey in 2004. Id.
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held onto their death sentencing regimes for slightly longer periods
of time. 132 Prince William was responsible for four executions after
1999: Lonnie Weeks (2000), John Muhammad (2009), Larry Elliot
(2009), and Paul Powell (2010). 133 And Fairfax County was
responsible for three after 1999: Bobby Ramdas (2000), Mir Kasi
(2002), and Alfredo Prieto (2015). 134
In 2017, Professor Brandon Garrett examined the decreasing
use of Virginia’s death penalty, comparing declines in Virginia and
North Carolina, and contrasting those experiences with Florida’s
continued use of the death penalty. 135 Notably, both Virginia and
North Carolina had instituted Capital Defender Offices
(“CDOs”). 136 In Virginia, the CDOs had been created in 2002 to
specialize in death penalty defense representation. 137 The CDOs
greatly increased the quality of representation provided to persons
facing the death penalty, leading Professor Garrett to “suggest
that capital representation may be a significant factor in the death

132. See id. (conveying the executions that have taken place under Prince
William County and Fairfax County death sentences when searching the
database with the state filter set for Virginia).
133. See id. (identifying the four executions that Prince William County was
responsible for after 1999). Prince William County was responsible for the
following executions in the 1990s: Timothy Bunch in 1992, Michael George in
1997, Dawud Mu’Min in 1997, Tony Mackall in 1998, and Carl Chichester in 1999.
Id.
134. See id. (naming the three individuals executed under Fairfax County
death sentences). Fairfax County’s executions in the 1990s were Wilbert Evans
in 1990, Dennis Eaton in 1998, and Johnile DuBois in 1998. Although Fairfax
City’s executions were not included in the DPIC’s calculation, the City was
responsible for two additional executions before the 2000s: Richard Whitley in
1987 and Dwayne Wright in 1998. Id.
135. See Garrett, supra note 120, at 720, 722 (comparing the Virginia, North
Carolina, and Florida death penalty experiences). The Virginia and North
Carolina systems were different, with the former providing direct representation
and the latter handling appointments, but both dramatically improved the
quality of capital defense representation. Id. (examining the differences and
similarities between the systems in North Carolina and Virginia, and how they
both led to a decline in death sentences).
136. See id. at 720 (“In 2001, similar to what happened in Virginia in the
following year, a statewide North Carolina Office of the Capital Defender was
created.”).
137. See id. at 678 (describing how regional capital defenders were created in
Virginia in the early 2000s).
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penalty decline . . . .” 138 As defense representation improved and
death sentences declined, however, some jurisdictions chose to
continue seeking the death penalty. 139
Professor Garrett observed that death sentencing became
increasingly concentrated in “large, densely populated counties,
like Fairfax County, the largest county in Virginia . . . .” 140 One
possible factor was “that large counties are more likely to absorb
the costs of seeking the death penalty . . . .” 141 This theory makes
sense, since funding to pay for the death penalty appears
important to a jurisdiction’s willingness to bring death penalty
cases. 142 Other research suggests, however, that population
density is not what distinguishes active capital counties from
counties that cease seeking the death penalty. 143 In fact, 2016
research by Professor Lee Kovarsky shows that the death penalty
“concentration levels do not correspond to population density or to
the distribution of homicides, and are not substantially
attributable to locally differentiated punishment norms.” 144
Professor Kovarsky examined the concentration of executions
in death penalty states over four periods: 1996–2000, 2001–2005,

138. Id. Professor Garrett expands on the death penalty’s decline in his book.
See generally Brandon Garrett, END OF ITS ROPE: HOW KILLING THE DEATH
PENALTY CAN REVIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2017).
139. See id. at 717–18 (discussing the counties in Virginia where the death
sentences were more often imposed).
140. Brandon Garrett, et al., The American Death Penalty Decline, 107 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 561, 605 (2017).
141. Id.; see also Garrett, supra note 120, at 717 (“Larger counties may be
better able to shoulder the expense of capital trials, both on the prosecution side
and the defense side . . . . Perhaps reflecting these changing political and cost
considerations, more of the capital trials occurred in the largest Virginia
counties.”).
142. See Greg Goelzhauser, Prosecutorial Discretion Under Resource
Constraints: Budget Allocations and Local Death-Charging Decisions, 96
JUDICATURE 161, 164 (2013) (“With budgets playing a central role in campaigns,
prosecutors facing budget constraints may be less inclined to seek the death
penalty relative to their better-funded counterparts.”).
143. See Lee Kovarsky, Muscle Memory and the Local Concentration of
Capital Punishment, 66 DUKE L.J. 259, 285 (2016) (arguing that the number of
death sentences in different locations is not directly attributable to the
concentration of the population).
144. Id. at 264 (emphasis added).

28

29 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 1 (2022)

2006–2010, and 2011–2015. 145 He observed that in the first period
in Virginia, there were fifty-two executions from twenty-seven
counties. 146 By the fourth period, there were three executions from
three counties. 147 Professor Kovarsky observed that executions
became more concentrated in Virginia “not so much because the
capitally active counties are responsible for more executions, but
because a number of infrequent producers became abstainers.” 148
In other words, many less active jurisdictions ceased seeking the
death penalty, while a few others continued. 149
To understand the concentration of executions in the counties
continuing to produce them, Professor Kovarsky noted that “[t]he
response to local crime is meted out largely through the
discretionary practice of local police, prosecutors, defense
attorneys, juries, and judges.” 150 These actors in the death penalty
system—referred to by Kovarsky as “local stakeholders”—”have
discretion that substantially affects capital outcomes, and certain
discretionary decisions tend to correlate with others.” 151
Kovarsky’s work provides a fascinating look at how the discretion
of these decisionmakers correlate. 152 But most significantly,
Kovarsky notes that “perhaps the greatest (if not most visible)
source of local variation is the discretion of the local prosecutor,”
and that “[m]ultiple studies confirm that prosecutorial discretion

145. See id. at 266–267 (“For death sentences and executions, I compute
separate concentration indices spanning the last twenty years of the modern era,
from 1996 to 2015.”).
146. See id. at 277 (laying out the values for executions at the state level,
including fifty-two executions in twenty-seven counties in Virginia between 1996–
2000).
147. See id. (illustrating the decline in executions in Virginia between the
period of 1996–2000 to 2011–2015).
148. Id. at 284.
149. See id. (observing statistics regarding different states’ implementations
of the death penalty and noting how certain jurisdictions stopped seeking the
death penalty).
150. Id. at 289.
151. Id. at 289–90.
152. See id. at 289 (“The accumulated decisionmaking of each stakeholder set
both reflect and produces what I call local muscle memory: the correlated exercise
of local discretion.”).
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has an extremely substantial effect on the pattern of capital
charging within a state.” 153
Virginia’s experience is consistent with Kovarsky’s work. 154 As
Virginia’s death penalty declined and became increasingly
concentrated, the importance of local decisionmakers became more
evident. But even before the decline in Virginia’s death penalty,
county-by-county disparities had been observed and attributed to
Virginia’s scheme of broad, standardless prosecutorial
discretion. 155 In fact, as early as 2002, a legislative review
concluded that disparities in prosecution by county were a
significant factor in Virginia’s death penalty. 156 The legislative
review concluded that although prosecutorial discretion was a
necessary component of the Virginia system, “it must be recognized
that this discretion . . . will generate outcomes that cannot be
easily reconciled on the grounds of fairness.” 157
Notably, Virginia’s local disparities could not be attributed to
the high density of active counties. Rather, the 2002 review showed
that “prosecutors in high-density population (typically urban)
localities [were] much less likely to seek the death penalty when
153. Id. at 290–91 (citing BARRY NAKELL & KENNETH A. HARDY, THE
ARBITRARINESS OF THE DEATH PENALTY 125–39 (1987) (North Carolina); RAYMOND
PATERNOSTER & ROBERT BRAME, AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF MARYLAND’S DEATH
SENTENCING SYSTEM WITH RESPECT TO THE INFLUENCE OF RACE AND LEGAL
JURISDICTION 26–31, 37–39 (2003) (Maryland) [https://perma.cc/QM8A-EVP2];
Leigh B. Bienan, et al., The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey:
The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 27, 178–84 (1988) (New
Jersey); William J. Bowers, The Pervasiveness of Arbitrariness and
Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 74 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1067, 1067–1100 (1983) (Florida); Donohue, supra note 56, at 650
(Connecticut), Raymond Paternoster, Race of Victim and Location of Crime: The
Decision to Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina, 74 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 754, 779–80 (1979) (South Carolina)); see also Katherine Barnes, et
al., Place Matters (Most): An Empirical Study of Prosecutorial Decisionmaking in
Death-Eligible Cases, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 305 (2009) (Missouri).
154. See J. LEGIS. AUDIT & REV. COMM’N OF THE VA. GEN. ASSEMB., REVIEW OF
VIRGINIA’S SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 18 (2002) (describing a legislative
study done regarding capital punishment in Virginia, including the use of
prosecutorial discretion) [https://perma.cc/9QH2-STFW].
155. See id. at III–VI (discussing the findings of a study dealing with how
prosecutorial discretion affects the death penalty’s application in Virginia).
156. See id. (highlighting the findings of a study regarding differences in
implementation of the death penalty in various places in Virginia).
157. Id. at 49.
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confronted with a capital-eligible case than their counterparts in
other localities.” 158 Prosecutors in medium-density jurisdictions
sought the death penalty in forty-five percent of eligible cases,
while prosecutors in high-density jurisdictions sought the death
penalty in sixteen percent of cases. 159 A decade later, the same
geographic disparities in Virginia were noted in the American Bar
Association’s comprehensive assessment of Virginia’s death
penalty scheme (“VIRGINIA REPORT”). 160
Both the JLARC REPORT and the VIRGINIA REPORT attributed
these geographic disparities to prosecutorial discretion. 161 The
VIRGINIA REPORT noted that Virginia “prosecutors have enormous
discretion in deciding whether or not to seek the death penalty.” 162
158. Id. at IV (emphasis in original).
159. See id. at V, 29 (comparing the tendency for prosecutors to seek the death
penalty in medium-density jurisdictions and in high-density jurisdictions); see
also id. at 22 (including Fairfax County in the study as a high-density jurisdiction,
and Prince William County as a medium-density jurisdiction).
160. See ABA, EVALUATING FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY IN STATE DEATH PENALTY
SYSTEMS: THE VIRGINIA DEATH PENALTY ASSESSMENT REPORT 118 (Aug. 2013)
(noting the local geographic disparity in capital cases within Virginia)
[https://perma.cc/J6PZ-Q7JT]. This report is the result of a nonpartisan analysis
of the Commonwealth’s death penalty scheme conducted by a “state-based
assessment team” designed to include “current or former judges, state legislators,
current or former prosecutors, current or former defense attorneys, active state
bar association leaders, law school professors, and anyone else whom the Project
felt was necessary.” Id. at ii. To ensure an unbiased viewpoint, “[t]eam members
[we]re not required to support or oppose the death penalty or a suspension of
executions.” Id. To eliminate partisanship concerns, “the assessment teams
focused on capital punishment laws and processes and did not consider whether
states, as a matter of morality, philosophy, or penological theory, should have the
death penalty.” Id. When judging a state’s performance, the ABA’s assessment
team evaluated its law and procedures in relation to “the protocols set out in the
ABA Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities’ 2001 publication, Death
Without Justice: A Guide for Examining the Administration of the Death Penalty
in the United States.” Id.
161. See J. LEGIS. AUDIT & REV. COMM’N OF THE VA. GEN. ASSEMB, supra note
154, at 29 (describing how location correlated with the rate prosecutors chose to
seek the death penalty for nearly identical crimes); see also ABA, supra note 160,
at 109 (noting the significant charging discretion that prosecutors possess).
162. ABA, supra note 160, at 109; see also VA. CODE § 19.2-71(B) (2011)
(acknowledging that the decision to charge a capital felony is within the complete
discretion of the local Commonwealth’s Attorney); In re Horan, 271 Va. 258, 264
(2006) (“The discretion of the Commonwealth’s Attorney to choose the offense for
which a defendant will be charged includes the discretion to decide whether to
seek the death penalty when capital murder is the charged offense.”).
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This unbridled discretion results in “considerable geographic
disparity in Virginia with respect to death penalty-eligible
cases.” 163 According to the JLARC REPORT, “‘[l]ocation, more than
any other factor, impacted the probability that prosecutors would
actually seek the death penalty for capital murder cases,’ even
though the report observed ‘no major differences in the types of
capital cases that occur’ in different parts of Virginia.” 164 “In fact,
‘[c]ases that are virtually identical in terms of the premeditated
murder and predicate offense, the associated brutality, the nature
of the evidence and the presence of the legally required
aggravators are treated differently’ depending on the jurisdiction
in which the crime occurred.” 165
To understand Virginia’s death penalty during its decline,
then, it is necessary to understand who was seeking it. In other
words, which counties had prosecutors who were exercising their
broad discretion to seek the death penalty, and how was that
discretion exercised? The VIRGINIA REPORT gave prosecutors an
opportunity to help answer these questions by attempting to
survey ten Commonwealth’s Attorney’s Offices, 166 including six
jurisdictions that had been particularly active in the modern
era. 167 Of the jurisdictions surveyed, however, only one returned a
response, and the Commonwealth’s Attorney for that locality was
a member of the “Virginia Death Penalty Assessment Team”
responsible for the report. 168 On behalf of the others, the Virginia
Association of Commonwealth’s Attorneys provided a letter stating

163.
164.

ABA, supra note 160, at 118.
Id. at 118–19 (quoting J. LEGIS. AUDIT & REV. COMM’N OF THE VA. GEN.
ASSEMB., supra note 154, at 29).
165. Id. (quoting J. LEGIS. AUDIT & REV. COMM’N OF THE VA. GEN. ASSEMB.,
supra note 154, at 28).
166. In Virginia, the “Commonwealth’s Attorney” is the elected prosecutor for
each county or city, holding a four-year term. See VA. CODE § 15.2-1626
(describing the electoral process and four-year term of a Commonwealth’s
Attorney in Virginia).
167. See ABA, supra note 160, at 115 & n.33. (noting that the American Bar
Association attempted to survey Commonwealth’s Attorney’s Offices in Danville
City, Richmond City, Roanoke City, Virginia Beach City, Arlington County,
Chesterfield County, Henrico County, Norfolk City, Pittsylvania County, and
Prince William County).
168. Id. at 115 & n.36.
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that the study was “not warranted” and “not in the best interest of
VACA or those [it] serve[s].” 169
Although Virginia’s Commonwealth’s Attorneys were
unresponsive to the ABA, much is known about the elected
prosecutors who carried on Virginia’s death penalty as it declined.
As noted above, two of the Virginia counties included in the DPIC’s
two percent of executions counties—Prince William County and
Fairfax County—continued to be responsible for executions after
the other localities had declined. 170 One of these, Prince William,
long had been a death county and was responsible for more
executions in the modern era than any other Virginia locality. 171
But the other, Fairfax, appeared to become more active as other
counties declined. “[F]rom 1977 until 2004, Fairfax imposed just
five death sentences, compared with smaller jurisdictions which
imposed many more,” including Prince William County. 172 But
although Fairfax did not appear to be a traditional death county,
Garrett notes, Fairfax County had three capital trials between
2005 and 2011. 173 To understand the continued pursuit of the
death penalty in these counties during Virginia’s decline, it is
necessary to consider the elected officials who made those decisions
and the localities they represented.
It is impossible to understand Prince William County’s role in
the modern Virginia death penalty without discussing Paul Ebert.
Ebert was first elected Commonwealth’s Attorney in 1968, four
years before the Supreme Court held the death penalty

169. Id. at 115 (quoting Letter from David N. Grimes, President, Va. Ass’n of
Commonwealth’s Att’ys, to John Douglass, Chair, Va. Death Penalty Assessment
Team (Apr. 23, 2012) (alterations in original)).
170. See Dieter, supra note 103, at 27–28 (listing Prince William County and
Fairfax County among the “two percent” counties). Of course, other jurisdictions
(including some not on the DPIC list) continued to bring capital charges and seek
the death penalty in the 2000s. However, I have chosen to focus on Prince William
County and Fairfax County as the two prolific members of the two percent that
continued to bear responsibility for executions after other active jurisdictions
desisted or reduced their involvement in Virginia’s death penalty system.
171. See id. at 27 (noting Prince William County’s nine executions since 1976,
the highest of any Virginia county).
172. Garrett, supra note 120, at 718 n.317.
173. See id. at 717 (stating that three capital trials occurred in Fairfax County
from 2005 to 2011).
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unconstitutional in Furman v. Georgia. 174 Ebert held office for
fifty-two years, almost the entirety of Virginia’s modern death
penalty era. During those fifty-two years, Ebert was responsible
for fifteen death sentences, 175 nine of which resulted in
executions. 176 No prosecutor was responsible for more death
sentences, and no jurisdiction was responsible for more executions.
During his half century as a Commonwealth’s Attorney, Ebert
was not circumspect about his love for the death penalty. Although
some prosecutors require careful deliberation before seeking
capital charges, Ebert “was quoted as stating that he . . . ’usually
charge[s] capital murder if it qualifies,’ and that in many
instances, ‘he charge[s] capital murder even if it’s questionable as
whether or not it fits in that category.” 177 In other words, Ebert
erred on the side of the death penalty.
Because of Ebert’s reputation as a death penalty prosecutor,
he was handpicked to secure a death sentence for John
Muhammad, the “Beltway Sniper.” 178 Muhammad and his
codefendant, teenager Lee Boyd Malvo, had committed crimes in
multiple jurisdictions, so Ebert “knew there would be jockeying to
see who would prosecute the duo first.” 179 Muhammad and Malvo
were charged and taken into federal custody, leaving United States
Attorney General John Ashcroft to decide which jurisdiction would

174. See Matthew Barakat, Ebert Retires After 52 Years of High-Profile
Prosecutions, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 24, 2019) (commenting that Ebert was first
elected as Commonwealth’s Attorney for Prince William County in 1968)
[https://perma.cc/6F8Y-PA3P].
175. See id. (“Over 13 terms as the chief prosecutor in Prince William County,
Ebert sent 15 people to death row, the most of any Virginia prosecutor.”).
176. See Dieter, supra note 103, at 27 (reporting Prince William County’s nine
executions since 1976).
177. See ABA, supra note 160, at 118 (quoting Frank Green, ‘Like They’re
God’: Prosecutorial Discretion Called Awesome Power, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH
(Feb. 5, 1998) (discussing Prince William County and Commonwealth’s Attorney
Paul Ebert) (alterations in original).
178. See Neal Augenstein, A Prosecutor’s Tale: Paul Ebert on Pursuing the
Death Penalty, WTOP NEWS (Sept. 28, 2012) (describing how U.S. Attorney
General John Ashcroft picked Paul Ebert to prosecute John Muhammad)
[https://perma.cc/U8L9-RZJB]; see also Rachel Philofsky, Beltway Sniper Attacks,
BRITANNICA (last updated Apr. 9, 2019) (noting that John Muhammad was known
as one of the “Beltway Snipers”) [https://perma.cc/H4DL-9BHR].
179. Augenstein, supra note 178.
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prosecute the men. 180 Ashcroft, who wanted the men sentenced to
death, chose Ebert to prosecute Muhmmad. 181 Robert Horan, then
the Fairfax County Commonwealth’s Attorney, was chosen to
prosecute Malvo. 182 Muhammad’s attorney asked, “What is more
unseemly than the attorney general of the United States saying
we’re going to go Virginia where Mr. Muhmmad is going to be
killed?” 183 Muhammad was sentenced to death. 184
Before the Muhammad prosecution, a profile about Ebert in
The Baltimore Sun portrayed him as an aggressive prosecutor who
would “be satisfied with nothing less than death” in Muhammad’s
case. 185 Ebert described himself as “really just a country boy” who
frequently went fishing with Robert Horan, Malvo’s prosecutor. 186
Although Ebert was raised in the Washington, D.C. suburbs, he
liked Prince William County because “it was close to a rural area
and there were a lot of dairy farms.” 187 A defense attorney who
described Ebert as “a good old boy from way back” suggested that
Muhammad’s defense attorneys—both of whom practiced law in
neighboring jurisdictions—were “going to have their hands full
because they’re two Northern boys coming down into our part of
the country . . . .” 188
At the time, Ebert downplayed his attachment to the death
penalty. The profile noted that “Ebert says he has little interest in
180. See id. (noting that United States Attorney General John Ashcroft had
to decide in which jurisdiction John Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo would be
prosecuted).
181. See id. (asserting that United States Attorney General John Aschroft
wanted to know where the defendants were likely to receive death sentences, and
consequently chose Paul Ebert to prosecute John Muhammad).
182. See id. (conveying how Robert Horan was chosen to prosecute Lee Boyd
Malvo); see also Jury Says Lead Sniper Should Die, TAMPA BAY TIMES (last
updated Sept. 2, 2005) (pointing out that John Ashcroft “sent the two to Virginia,
citing the state’s ability to impose ‘the ultimate sanction’”) [https://perma.cc/8JTZJ8TR].
183. Jury Says Lead Sniper Should Die, TAMPA BAY TIMES (last updated Sept.
2, 2005) [https://perma.cc/8JTZ-J8TR]
184. See id. (noting that John Muhammad was sentenced to death).
185. Stephen Kiehl, Muhammad Faces Aggressive Longtime Prosecutor in
Va., THE BALTIMORE SUN (Oct. 12, 2003) [https://perma.cc/G3XW-JF9N].
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
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the machinations of the death penalty and how it is carried out,
and doesn’t go to the executions of the men he has sent to death
row.” 189 Ebert did not know how many men he had sent to their
deaths: “‘I don’t count ‘em,’ he said. ‘It doesn’t basically do anything
for me to seek the death penalty. I don’t want to witness an
execution. Having the death penalty is just a mechanism of the law
that I’m sworn to uphold.’” 190 When John Muhammad was
executed in 2009, however, Paul Ebert was there to watch him
die. 191
Ebert’s death penalty prosecutions, including that of John
Muhammad, were not without criticism, particularly for Ebert’s
refusal to disclose exculpatory evidence. 192 In fact, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals scolded Ebert for the amount of evidence
that was not disclosed to the defense in Muhammad’s case. 193
Although the Court did not grant Muhammad relief, the Court
stated that it “by no means condone[d] the actions of the
Commonwealth in this case. As a matter of practice, the
prosecution should err on the side of disclosure, especially when a
defendant is facing the specter of execution.” 194
Several years later, the Court also found that Ebert had been
“rightly lambasted” by the federal district court for his failure to
disclose exculpatory evidence in another death penalty case, that
of Justin Wolfe. 195 The Fourth Circuit noted that Ebert’s
nondisclosure was “entirely intentional,” citing Ebert’s own
“flabbergasting explanation that he has ‘found in the past when
you have information that is given to certain counsel and certain
defendants, they are able to fabricate a defense around what is

189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Jeanne Meserve & Mike Ahlers, Sniper John Allen Muhammad
Executed, CNN (Nov. 11, 2009) (providing commentary from Ebert following
Muhammad’s execution) [https://perma.cc/RQC5-KMYF].
192. See, e.g., Muhammad v. Kelly, 575 F.3d 359, 370 (4th Cir. 2009)
(analyzing Ebert’s withholding of exculpatory information during Muhammad’s
trial).
193. Id. (“While not admirable, the Commonwealth’s actions did not violate
the Constitution.”).
194. Id.
195. Wolfe v. Clarke, 691 F.3d 410, 423–24 (4th Cir. 2012).
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provided.’” 196 When Wolfe received a new trial, Ebert’s continued
misconduct led the federal district court to bar any reprosecution,
a move that was later reversed by a divided panel of the Fourth
Circuit. 197 When Wolfe ultimately entered a plea agreement,
however, the Virginia State Bar failed to discipline Ebert for his
actions in the prosecution. Despite the Fourth Circuit’s blistering
criticism of Ebert’s discovery practices in capital cases, his office
continued to seek the death penalty. Most of these cases, however,
ended in plea agreements. 198
In the fifty-two years that Ebert held office, the demographics
of Prince William County also changed dramatically. When Ebert
was a young lawyer, the county was “a rural outpost with 50,000
people at the time.” 199 Now, Prince William is home to almost
500,000. 200 Although Prince William was historically white, 22.2%
of the population is now Black or African American, 24.5% is
Hispanic or Latino, and 9.4% Asian. 201 As Prince William became
a “majority minority” county, white power structures rebelled at
this shift.
For example, many are familiar with SB 1070, Arizona’s
controversial 2010 law that required state and local officials to
enforce federal immigration laws by, among other things,
demanding proof of legal status “where reasonable suspicion exists
that the person is an alien who is unlawfully present in the United
States.” 202 But a precursor to this bill existed in Prince William
196. Id. at 423.
197. Wolfe v. Clarke, 718 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2013). Full disclosure: the author
of this Article was a member of Wolfe’s retrial defense team, and had previously
been a student in the Innocence Project Clinic at the University of Virginia School
of Law, which was involved in the investigation supporting Wolfe’s habeas
petition and relief.
198. See Garrett, supra note 120, at 667 (noting that “improvements at trial
[in Virginia capital cases since 2005] are representative of the deeper changes in
the work that lawyers now do early on in capital defense, producing plea bargains
that result in sentences less than death in the vast majority of cases.”).
199. Kiehl, supra note 185.
200. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Quick Facts: Prince William County, Virginia (July
1, 2021) (providing the population data of Prince William County)
[https://perma.cc/L4QA-J4MA].
201. Id.
202. Senate Bill 1070, Ariz. State Senate (2010) [https://perma.cc/G2B69BJ9].
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County, where its proponent—county Supervisor John T.
Stirrup—characterized it as “the first step towards taking back our
community[.]” 203 This bill, which exemplified the prejudice and
racial tensions that existed in the county, resulted in an exodus of
Latinos from Prince William. 204 Despite the efforts of some
residents to keep Prince William white, the county is now “the
second most populous and the most diverse” in Virginia. 205
By the time of Ebert’s final death penalty case—the 2018 trial
of Ronald Hamilton—Prince William County had become a
different locality from the one in which he used to easily secure
death sentences. At the time, Ebert observed that “the Hamilton
case is the first time his office has failed to persuade a jury to
recommend a death sentence.” 206 Ebert also faulted the changing
demographics of Prince William for the refusal of the jury, which
“included five people of color,” to sentence Hamilton to death. 207
“‘The demographics of Prince William were relatively conservative
all those years and much more pro-death,’ Ebert said. ‘And I

203. Nick Miroff, Prince William Passes Resolution Targeting Illegal
Immigration, WASH. POST (July 11, 2007) [https://perma.cc/H6JH-MJ28].
204. See Jeremy Borden, Latinos Returning to Prince William After
Immigration Crackdown, but Scars Remain, WASH. POST (June 26, 2012)
[https://perma.cc/K4X4-JVMJ]; see also Sasha Ingber, Undocumented Children
Fuel New Tension on Immigration in Virginia, NAT. GEO. (Aug. 16, 2014) (noting
that a group named “Help Save Manassas” lobbied for anti-immigrant law during
the time and argued that “border crashers have contributed to rising crime rates,
increasing burdens on our schools, hospitals, and public services, and the very
destruction of our American culture . . . .”) [https://perma.cc/M7EM-NHSY].
205. Daniel Berti, Census: Prince William Among Fastest Growing, Most
Diverse Counties in Virginia, PRINCE WILLIAM TIMES (Aug. 17, 2021) (last updated
Oct. 12, 2021) [https://perma.cc/UX9R-VTRG].
206. Ian Shapira, He’s Sent More Killers to Death Row Than Any Virginia
Prosecutor. But Not This Time, WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/VTX4-W3SL].
207. Id. (noting that “[o]nce rural and overwhelming white, the county is now
approaching a half-million residents, and the majority are minorities.”).
(indicating that the demographics of a once rural and majority white community
is now a majority minority population).
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always knew someone on the jury. Now, I seldom know someone
on the jury.’” 208 Ebert retired the following year. 209
As Virginia’s death penalty declined in the 2000s, Fairfax also
remained an active jurisdiction. During the modern era of
Virginia’s death penalty, Fairfax’s first Commonwealth’s Attorney
was Robert Horan, Jr., who led the locality’s prosecutions from
1967–2007. 210 In addition to prosecuting in neighboring counties
for decades, Horan and Ebert were friends who frequently fished
together, and Horan considered Ebert “a master” of fishing. 211
When Ebert was chosen to prosecute Muhammad and Horan
chosen to prosecute Malvo, a New York Times profile described the
men as “death penalty veterans.” 212 Referring to the purposeful
assignment of the cases to death penalty prosecutors, the profile
noted that “to many people in the Washington area, the number
that really counts is the 17 people they have sent to death row.” 213
Fairfax is an interesting example of how focusing only on the
county of prosecution can sometimes obscure the role of the
individual prosecutor. For example, the 2013 DPIC report that
listed Fairfax as one of the two percent of counties responsible for
the majority of executions in the modern era attributed five to
Fairfax County. 214 But at that time, Horan had been responsible
for seven executions. Two of the men executed—Richard Whitley
208. Id. Of course, in addition to the shifting demographics of the county and
lack of acquaintances on the jury, Ebert also ran into one of the greatest factors
in Virginia’s declining death penalty: the CDO. As discussed by Professor Garrett,
the establishment of regional capital defenders greatly improved Virginia’s death
penalty representation, contributing to the decline in Virginia’s death penalty.
Garrett, supra note 120, at 666. It is no coincidence that Hamilton was
represented by an experienced, high-quality defense team led by the Northern
Virginia Office of the Capital Defender.
209. See Justin Jouvenal, Virginia’s Longest-Running Prosecutor Plans to
Retire at the End of the Year, WASH. POST (Feb. 5, 2019) (noting that Ebert
announced he would retire at the end of [2019]) [https://perma.cc/HTR6-UVT2].
210. Harry Jaffe, What I’ve Learned: Robert Horan, WASHINGTONIAN (May 1,
2008) (detailing the career of Robert Horan Jr.) [https://perma.cc/T9HT-9ZET].
211. Kiehl, supra note 185 (describing the relationship between Ebert and
Horan).
212. Adam Liptak, Prosecutors in Sniper Cases Are Death Penalty Veterans,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2002) [https://perma.cc/9N87-JFKZ].
213. Id.
214. See Dieter, supra note 103, at 29 (listing Fairfax County as responsible
for five executions).
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(1987) and Dwayne Wright (1998)—had been sentenced to death
for crimes committed in the City of Fairfax, a locality also
prosecuted by Horan and his office. 215 Additionally, an eighth man
who was executed in 2015, Alfredo Prieto, was originally
prosecuted by Horan. 216
In a retrospective on his career, Horan was asked whether he
ever witnessed an execution. Horan replied that he had, but that
he “kind of forg[o]t who—I went down to watch one of the guys in
the electric chair on Spring Street in Richmond.” 217 Asked to
describe the experience, Horan stated that “[i]t was interesting”
and that “the guys who get capital punishment tend to be such a
horrible breed of human being.” 218 Like Ebert, Horan prosecuted
for decades of demographic change, seeing Fairfax change from “a
rural county” to a majority minority suburb with Virginia’s largest
population. 219 At the same time, Fairfax has become one of the
wealthiest counties in America. 220
Horan was succeeded by his Chief Deputy, Raymond Morrogh,
in 2007. 221 As Commonwealth’s Attorney, Morrogh was responsible
for the resentencing of Alfredo Prieto, who became one of the last
men executed in Virginia. 222 Morrogh also prosecuted Mark
Lawlor, the last person sentenced to death in Virginia, whose
death sentence was vacated in 2018. 223 In 2019, however, Morrogh
215. See DPIC, supra note 97; see also Harry Jaffe, What I’ve Learned: Robert
Horan, WASHINGTONIAN (May 1, 2008) [https://perma.cc/T9HT-9ZET].
216. Jaffe, supra note 210 (referring to the Prieto prosecution).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See Emmie Martin, This is the No. 1 Highest-Earning Region in the US,
and it Isn’t in New York or California, CNBC (Mar. 20, 2019) (noting that Fairfax
County has become one of the counties with the highest median household
incomes) [https://perma.cc/MX3P-RNAU].
221. See Raymond F. Morrogh, VA. DEP’T OF ELECTIONS (noting that Morrogh
was elected as the Commonwealth’s Attorney in 2007, winning the election with
56% of the vote) [https://perma.cc/A485-M6G5].
222. See Tom Jackman, Prieto Sentenced to Death for Fairfax Murders, WASH.
POST (Nov. 5, 2010, 10:56 P.M.) (noting that Morrogh prosecuted Prieto)
[https://perma.cc/4RV7-LLVU].
223. See Tom Jackman, Va. Man Sentenced to Death in 2011 Gets New
Hearing, And New Prosecutor Agrees to Life Sentence, WASH. POST (Mar. 12, 2020)
(noting that Morrogh had originally prosecuted Lawlor) [https://perma.cc/NE875ME3].
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was upset in the Democratic primary by Steve Descano, whose
criminal justice platform included opposition to the death
penalty. 224 During the primary, Morrogh’s campaign inexplicably
claimed that he was “personally and religiously opposed” to capital
punishment. 225 After losing to Descano, however, Morrogh
unsuccessfully backed his Republican opponent in the general
election. 226 Once in office, Descano reached a plea agreement with
Lawlor that guaranteed he would spend life in prison without
parole, a decision that Morrogh decried. 227 With both Ebert and
Morrogh out of office by January 2020, neither Prince William
County nor Fairfax County sought a death sentence in the final
full year of Virginia’s death penalty. 228
The Virginia experience exemplifies the research indicating
that
it
is
individual
local
decisionmakers—especially
prosecutors—who are responsible for the increasing concentration
of the death penalty. As capital punishment declined in Virginia,
individual prosecutors with longstanding commitments to the
death penalty continued the practice. As elected Commonwealth’s
Attorney for more than fifty years, Paul Ebert was responsible for
the most death sentences and executions in Virginia. 229 In
neighboring Fairfax County, Ebert’s longtime friend Robert Horan
oversaw forty years of death penalty prosecutions, a tradition that
224. See Justin Jouvenal, Fairfax County’s Democratic Prosecutor Will
Endorse an Independent—Not a Democrat—To Replace Him, WASH. POST (Sept.
26, 2019) (describing that Descano promised to bring liberal reforms, including
ending the use of the death penalty) [https://perma.cc/GX67-NRE6].
225. See Brad Swanson, Should Values Lead Justice? Fairfax Prosecutor
Candidates Clash, THE BLUE VIEW (May 25, 2019) (noting that despite Morrogh’s
wholly discretionary decisions to seek the death penalty, he claimed to be opposed
to it) [https://perma.cc/SL3C-T6WC].
226. See Defeated Democratic Commonwealth’s Attorney Endorses Republican
in General Election, STEVE DESCANO DEMOCRAT FOR COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEY
(Sept. 26, 2019) (noting that Ray Morrogh endorsed the Republican candidate in
the general election for Commonwealth’s Attorney in Fairfax County)
[https://perma.cc/2MWM-UAM7].
227. See Jackman, supra note 223 (describing the Lawlor plea agreement).
228. See Virginia Abolishes the Death Penalty, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE (last
updated Mar. 24, 2021) (noting that Virginia has had no executions since 2017
and no new death sentences since 2011) [https://perma.cc/SV2U-87GE].
229. See Matthew Barakat, Ebert Retires After 52 Years of High-Profile
Prosecutions, ABC NEWS (Dec. 24, 2019, 2:33 P.M.) (describing Ebert’s history of
death penalty prosecutions) [https://perma.cc/CQ4Y-Y6VM].
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was carried on by his immediate successor, who had been his chief
deputy. 230 While looking at the county of prosecution largely
captures the effect of individual prosecutors, it does so imperfectly,
as exemplified by the exclusion of two of Horan’s executions from
the Fairfax County total.
In sum, Virginia’s experience with the death penalty
powerfully illustrates the increasing localization of the death
penalty. This localization has rendered capital punishment
increasingly arbitrary, as discussed by the Glossip dissenters. 231
Multiple reasons for localization have been suggested, and the
reasons are likely complex. 232 For example, the Glossip dissenters
point to differences such as local prosecutors, defense resources,
and race. 233 Ultimately, the local prosecutor cannot be artificially
divorced from the jurisdiction that elected him or her, and factors
such as wealth, racial composition, and politics undeniably play
into election. But at the same time, it was the broad discretion of
certain local decisionmakers—particularly those who had been
involved in perpetuating the death penalty for decades—that
maintained the death penalty during its decline in Virginia’s.
In and of itself, geography (particularly county of prosecution)
is an arbitrary factor in the administration of the death penalty.
In America, a county line easily can make the difference between
whether a defendant lives or dies. But it is not the earth within a
geographical boundary that makes the decision whether to seek an
execution. In some jurisdictions, including Virginia, elected
prosecutors with unfettered discretion decide. Of course, some
might argue that prosecutors should be granted broad discretion
to make decisions about charging defendants and seeking
sentences, and that this is not constitutionally problematic. But as

230. See Martha Neil, 40-Year Prosecutor Still Swinging as Era Ends, ABA
JOURNAL (Apr. 12, 2007, 12:58 A.M.) [https://perma.cc/3M8B-NGHD].
231. See Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 920 (2015) (Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ.,
dissenting) (noting that “local geography” is one of the “irrelevant or improper
factors” that “significantly determine who receives the death penalty,” and that
such factors “strongly suggest[] that the death penalty is imposed arbitrarily.”).
232. See id. at 919 (citing research that attributes local disparities to multiple
complex factors such as prosecutorial discretion, defense resources,
demographics, and politics).
233. Id. (same).

42

29 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 1 (2022)

illustrated by Part II, 234 the Eighth Amendment proscribes
arbitrary death sentences and executions regardless of their cause.
Indeed, the Glossip dissent suggests that localization has resulted
in constitutionally suspect arbitrariness, whatever the underlying
causes of that geographic concentration.
Additionally, Virginia’s experience with death penalty
localization suggests some reasons the role of prosecutorial
discretion in geographic disparities should matter. For example,
Paul Ebert’s admission that he brought capital charges even when
it was “questionable” is contrary to Gregg’s vision that the death
penalty could be administered in an evenhanded manner that
would narrow and guide discretion. 235 The admission that
changing demographics, including race of the decisionmaker,
influenced the administration of Virginia’s death penalty as it
declined challenges any basic concept of fairness. And the failure
of Robert Horan to recall the name of a human being he charged,
prosecuted, placed on death row, and personally watched be
electrocuted runs contrary to the gravity of the death penalty that
our system is meant to reflect. 236 These glimpses at Virginia’s
modern death penalty suggest a significant flaw with Gregg’s
fundamental premise that state capital sentencing systems can
eliminate arbitrariness, or even reduce its risk to some
constitutionally tolerable point: there is always a human (and thus
imperfect) decisionmaker.

234. See supra Part II.
235. See ABA, supra note 160, at 118 (quoting Frank Green, ‘Like They’re
God’: Prosecutorial Discretion Called Awesome Power, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH
(Feb. 5, 1998) (noting that Ebert “was quoted as stating that he . . . ’usually
charge[s] capital murder if it qualifies,’ and that in many instances, ‘he charge[s]
capital murder even if it’s questionable as whether or not it fits in that category.”)
(alterations in original). This is obviously antithetical to the United States
Supreme Court’s vision of death penalty schemes that can ensure the punishment
is limited to a narrowly defined set of offenses.
236. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 290 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (“Death is truly an awesome punishment. The calculated killing of a
human being by the State involves, by its very nature, a denial of the executed
person’s humanity.”); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976)
(reporting that “the penalty of death is qualitative different from a sentence of
imprisonment, however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from life
imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or
two.”).
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V. The Geography of the Post-Virginia Death Penalty
Just as the decline of Virginia’s death penalty speaks to the
increasing localization of capital punishment in America, the
abolition of its death penalty speaks to the growing unusualness
and arbitrariness of capital punishment in our country. With
Virginia’s abolition, the national picture of the death penalty has
changed both quantitatively and qualitatively. Of course, there is
one fewer death penalty state, and capital punishment is no longer
available in some of America’s longtime death counties. But
abolition in Virginia—the first southern state to end its death
penalty—also alters the cultural landscape of capital punishment
in America.
A fundamental concept in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
is “that the words of the Amendment are not precise, and that their
scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its meaning from
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.” 237 In other words, the concept of what
constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment” can and does change
as we develop as a society.
In the modern era, the Supreme Court has frequently applied
the “evolving standards of decency” concept in the context of
categorical exclusions from the death penalty. 238 This
jurisprudence excludes certain categories of crimes or defendants
from either a death sentence or execution, focusing on whether the
death penalty is proportionate under the circumstances. 239 For
example, the Court has referred to evolving standards of decency
in holding the death penalty unconstitutional for intellectually

237. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (citing Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910)) (explaining that the Eighth Amendment “may
be therefore progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.”).
238. See id. at 100–01 (noting that “[t]he Court recognized in [Weems] that
the words of the Amendment are not precise, and that their scope is not static.
The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society.”) (citing Weems, 217 U.S. 349).
239. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (referring to the
requirement that the death penalty be proportionate to the crime committed).
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disabled persons 240 and juveniles, 241 as well as in barring the
execution of the insane. 242 Similarly, the Court has relied on
related principles in finding the death penalty unconstitutional for
the rape of an adult woman, 243 for felony murder without proof that
the defendant killed or intended a death, 244 and for rape of a child
that does not result in death. 245
The Court’s categorical exclusion jurisprudence follows a twostep analysis that encompasses both quantitative and qualitative
questions. Quantitatively, the Court asks whether a “national
consensus” has developed regarding a category of death penalty
practice. 246 Primarily, the Court looks to how many jurisdictions
allow death sentences for a certain crime or category of
defendant. 247 The Court also looks to other objective indicia, such
240. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311–12 (2002) (barring the death
penalty for intellectually disabled persons).
241. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561–63 (2005) (holding that persons
may not be executed for crimes committed under the age of eighteen).
242. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986) (barring execution of
the insane).
243. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (holding that the death penalty is a
disproportionate and excessive punishment for the rape of an adult woman).
244. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982) (holding that the death
penalty may not be applied to persons guilty of felony murder who did not commit
the actual killing or intend the death).
245. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 438 (2008) (finding the death
penalty unconstitutional for the crime of child rape that does not result in the
death of the child).
246. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 (concluding that “it is fair to say that a
national consensus has developed against” execution of the intellectually
disabled); Roper, 543 U.S. at 564 (“The evidence of national consensus against the
death penalty for juveniles is similar, and in some respects parallel, to the
evidence Atkins held sufficient to demonstrate a national consensus against the
death penalty for the [intellectually disabled].”); Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 426 (“The
evidence of a national consensus with respect to the death penalty for child
rapists, as with respect to juveniles, [intellectually disabled] offenders, and
vicarious felony murderers, shows divided opinion but, on balance, an opinion
against it.”).
247. See, e.g., Coker, 433 U.S. 593–96 (analyzing data and concluding that
“[t]he current judgment with respect to the death penalty for rape is not wholly
unanimous among state legislatures, but it obviously weighs very heavily on the
side of rejecting capital punishment as a suitable penalty for raping an adult
woman.”); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789–93 (1982) (quantifying state
positions on the death penalty for felony murder and observing that “only a small
minority of jurisdictions—eight—allow the death penalty to be imposed solely
because the defendant somehow participated in a robbery in the course of which
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as jury verdicts, to assess contemporary acceptance of the death
penalty under certain circumstances. 248 Finally, the Court looks to
whether there is a significant trend indicating that the death
penalty is now viewed as disproportionate for certain persons or
crimes. 249 The Court has observed that “[i]t is not so much the
number of these States that is significant, but the consistency of
the direction of change.” 250 Trends against the death penalty are
particularly notable because of a political reality: “the well-known
fact that anticrime legislation is far more popular than legislation
providing protections for persons guilty of violent crime . . . .” 251
The second step of the Supreme Court’s “evolving standards of
decency” analysis is a qualitative assessment in which the justices
consider their own judgments of a punishment’s continued
constitutionality. 252 As part of this analysis, the Court considers
a murder was committed.”); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313–17 (considering the number
of states that have barred execution of the intellectually disabled); Roper, 543
U.S. at 564–67 (discussing which states allow the execution of juveniles);
Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 422–26 (“[I]n 45 jurisdictions, petitioner could not be
executed for child rape of any kind. That number surpasses the 30 States in
Atkins and Roper and the 42 States in Enmund that prohibited the death penalty
under the circumstances those cases considered.”).
248. See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181 (“The jury also is a significant and
reliable objective index of contemporary values because it is so directly
involved.”); Coker, 433 U.S. at 596 (stating “that it is thus important to look to the
sentencing decisions that juries have made in the course of assessing whether
capital punishment is an appropriate penalty for the crime being tried.”) (citing
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 794 (1982) (“Society’s
rejection of the death penalty for accomplice liability in felony murders is also
indicated by the sentencing decisions that juries have made . . . . The evidence is
overwhelming that American juries have repudiated imposition of the death
penalty for crimes such as petitioner’s.”); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 (noting that
“even in those States that allow the execution of mentally retarded offenders, the
practice is uncommon.”).
249. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315 (“It is not so much the number of these
States that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of change.”); Roper,
543 U.S. at 567 (noting that “the objective indicia of consensus” to be considered
when deciding a death penalty case must include “the consistency in the trend
toward abolition of the practice”).
250. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315; see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 566 (concluding that
“the same consistency of direction of change has been demonstrated”).
251. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315.
252. See, e.g., Coker, 433 U.S. at 597 (“These recent events evidencing the
attitude of state legislatures and sentencing juries do not wholly determine this
controversy, for the Constitution contemplates that in the end our own judgment
will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty

46

29 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 1 (2022)

whether the death penalty serves any penological purposes, such
as deterrence or retribution. 253 The Court also looks to specific
fairness problems raised by the Eighth Amendment issue at
hand. 254 For example, in finding the execution of intellectually
disabled unconstitutional, the Court pointed to concerns that the
intellectually disabled are at risk of making false confessions,
being less capable of assisting in their own defenses, and appearing
less remorseful. 255 And in holding the death penalty
unconstitutional for minors, the Court looked to their immaturity,
vulnerability, and capacity for change. 256
There is no reason, however, that the concept of “evolving
standards of decency” should be limited to categorical exclusion
under the Eighth Amendment.”); Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797 (“Although the
judgments of legislatures, juries, and prosecutors weigh heavily in the balance, it
us for us ultimately to judge whether the Eighth Amendment” permits the death
penalty for a given crime); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (“Our independent evaluation
of the issue reveals no reason to disagree with the judgment of the ‘legislatures
that have recently addressed the matter’ and concluded that death is not a
suitable punishment for a[n intellectually disabled] criminal.”); Roper, 543 U.S.
at 574 (reaffirming the need for the Court “to bring its independent judgment to
bear on the proportionality of the death penalty for a particular class of crimes or
offenders . . . .”); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 434 (2008) (“As we have
said in other Eighth Amendment cases, objective evidence of contemporary
values . . . is entitled to great weight, but it does not end our inquiry . . . . We turn,
then, to the resolution of the question before us, which is informed by our
precedents and our own understanding of the Constitution and the rights it
secures”).
253. See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798–801 (stating that putting Enmund to death
“does not measurably contribute to the retributive end of ensuring that the
criminal gets his just desserts”); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317–20 (“The theory of
deterrence in capital sentencing is predicated upon the notion that the increased
severity of the punishment will inhibit criminal actors from carrying out
murderous conduct.”); Roper, 543 U.S. at 571–72 (discussing that the penological
justifications for the death penalty do not apply with the same force to juveniles
as it does adults).
254. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318 (explaining that individuals with intellectual
disabilities are not exempted from criminal punishment but that they do have
diminished personal culpability); Roper, 543 U.S. at 570 (“From a moral
standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of
an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will
be reformed.”); Coker, 433 U.S. 598 (arguing that the crime of rape does not
compare to the crime of murder and death should be reserved for the most serious
offenses).
255. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320–21.
256. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70.
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challenges. Rather, the concept can be applied to the question of
the American death penalty as a whole. Indeed, the essential
meaning of this concept is that the Eighth Amendment does not
bind us to accept historical punishments that have become
constitutionally intolerable. As the Court observed in Trop v.
Dulles, 257 “[t]he provisions of the Constitution are not time-worn
adages or hollow shibboleths. They are vital, living principles that
authorize and limit governmental powers in our Nation.” 258
Furthermore, the Eighth Amendment is meant to be a constraint
upon the legislatures, securing an individual right to be free of
cruel and unusual punishments from the power of the government.
“The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is the
dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the
Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within
the limits of civilized standards.” 259 As civilized standards evolve,
the Eighth Amendment is meant to reflect that growth.
In fact, long before the Court’s categorical exclusion
jurisprudence solidified, several of the concurring justices in
Furman referred to “evolving standards of decency” in holding that
the death penalty was unconstitutional as then applied. 260 By
doing so, these justices acknowledged that the evolving standards
analysis could encompass the death penalty as applied in our
nation as a whole. 261 And although the 1976 cases permitted the
American death penalty to resume, they also found that
mandatory death sentences were inconsistent with evolving
standards of decency. 262 At the time, the Court concluded that “one
257. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
258. Id. at 103.
259. Id. at 100.
260. Furman, 408 U.S. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[T]he Eighth
Amendment ‘must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society.’”); id. at 269–70 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (“We know . . . that the Clause ‘must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’”); id.
at 327 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“Emphasizing the Flexibility inherent in the
words ‘cruel and unusual’ . . . ’[t]he amendment must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the process of a maturing society.’”).
261. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 269–70
(Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 327 (Marshall, J., concurring).
262. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293–301 (1976) (holding
that mandatory death sentences are unconstitutional).
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of the most significant developments in our society’s treatment of
capital punishment has been the rejection of the common-law
practice of inexorably imposing a death sentence upon every
person convicted of a specified offense.” 263
The evolving standards concept is thus not limited to
piecemeal challenges to the death penalty. It also can be applied to
the American death penalty to assess—as the Furman justices
did—whether the practice of capital punishment reflects
contemporary standards of humanity. The Glossip dissenters did
just this, using the evolving standards analysis to consider
whether the death penalty had become unconstitutionally unusual
as of 2015, particularly in light of its national decline. 264
The Glossip dissent focused on the first step—objective indicia
of a punishment’s rejection—to look at the increasingly unusual
use of the death penalty. 265 The dissenters noted that “in 2014, only
seven States carried out an execution” and “just 73 persons were
sentenced to death.” 266 The dissenters also considered how “the
number of active death penalty States has fallen dramatically,”
with ten states abolishing the death penalty between 1972 and
2015. 267 In addition to the nineteen abolition states, eleven states
had not executed a person for eight years. 268 Nine of the twenty
states that had carried out executions in the preceding eight years
had “conducted fewer than five in that time, making an execution
in those States a fairly rare event.” 269 And of course, the dissenters
also pointed to the increasing geographic localization of the death
penalty, with emerging county-by-county disparities. 270 Finally,
263. Id. at 301.
264. See Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 938–44 (Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ.,
dissenting) (discussing the decline in the “imposition and implementation” of
death sentences).
265. See id.
266. Id. at 939.
267. See id. at 939–40 (noting that the death penalty had been abolished in
nine states by 1972, but functionally or formally abolished in thirty states by
2015).
268. See id. at 940.
269. Id.
270. See id. at 941–42 (noting that “use of the death penalty has become
increasingly concentrated geographically” and that as a result of localization, “it
is now unusually to find capital punishment in the United States, at least when
we consider the Nation as a whole”).
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the dissenters pointed to the consistent direction of change
towards abolition. 271
These numbers have changed since 2015, but the direction of
change has remained consistent. Since 2015, five more states—
Delaware (2016), Washington (2018), New Hampshire (2019),
Colorado (2020), and Virginia (2021)—have abolished the death
penalty. 272 New moratoria on executions have been declared in
California 273 and by the federal government. 274 Twenty-three
states, plus the District of Columbia, no longer have a death
penalty. 275 Even more startling, thirteen states and the U.S.
Military have the death penalty, but have not carried out an
execution in a decade. 276 Another two states—Arizona and Idaho—
have not executed a person in at least five years. 277 In 2021, only
five states (Texas, Missouri, Alabama, Oklahoma, and Mississippi)
and the federal government were responsible for executions. 278 The
same was true in 2020, when only the federal government and
Texas, Georgia, Tennessee, Alabama, and Missouri executed
people. 279 Although these were pandemic years, the numbers were
not dramatically different in 2019 (seven states responsible for
executions), 2018 (eight states), 2017 (eight states, including
Virginia), and 2016 (five states). 280 The end of Virginia’s death

271. See id. at 943 (explaining that an increasing number of states have
abolished the death penalty or ceased executions, and that “the direction of
change is consistent.”).
272. See State by State, DPIC (reporting which states maintain capital
punishment) [https://perma.cc/8KLC-VBN5].
273. GAVIN NEWSOM, EXEC. DEPT., EXEC. ORDER N-09-19 (Mar. 13, 2019)
(ordering an executive moratorium on the death penalty) [https://perma.cc/UUE5JYCX].
274. Memorandum from Att’y Gen. Merrick Garland to Deputy Att’y Gen., the
Assoc. Att’y Gen., Heads of Dept. Components, “Moratorium on Federal
Executions Pending Review of Policies and Procedures” (July 1, 2021) (ordering a
moratorium on federal executions) [https://perma.cc/3M5U-SM2C].
275. States with No Recent Executions, DPIC, (last updated Nov. 17, 2021)
(listing states that have had no recent executions) [https://perma.cc/BQ9F-3RD7].
276. See id.
277. Id. (reporting that Arizona and Idaho have the death penalty but have
not executed anyone in at least five years).
278. See Execution Database, supra note 119.
279. See id.
280. See id.
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penalty thus has contributed to a growing, consistent trend against
the use of the death penalty in America. In other words, abolition
in Virginia is another data point supporting the increasingly
evident conclusion that the death penalty no longer comports with
our country’s civilized standards.
Virginia adds to this picture not only quantitatively, but also
qualitatively. Virginia was a true death penalty state. In 1608,
Virginia became the first colony to carry out an execution, the
shooting death of Captain George Kendall. 281 Historically, Virginia
has carried out the most executions. 282 And in the modern era,
Virginia executed 113 people, a total second only to Texas at the
time of abolition. 283 Although Virginia’s death penalty had
declined significantly, the Commonwealth also had two executions
in the five years preceding abolition, both under a Democratic
governor. 284
Significantly, Virginia also is the first southern state to
abolish the death penalty. 285 Although the death penalty is not an
exclusively southern practice, it is a heavily southern one. In the
modern era, the South has been responsible for 1258 executions,
while the Midwest has been responsible for 192, the West for 86,
and the Northeast for 4. 286 The death penalty in America,
particularly in the South, is also tied to a history of racial violence
and lynching. Virginia was a prominent lynching state, with

281. See Andone, supra note 2 (stating that Virginia carried out the colonies’
first recorded execution); see also Natasha Frost, Was the Colonies’ First Death
Penalty Handed to a Mutineer or Spy?, HIST. (Aug. 24, 2018) (telling the story of
the execution of Captain George Kendall) [https://perma.cc/4KY8-DTAY].
282. See Virginia, DPIC (“Virginia has executed more people in its history
than any other state.”) [https://perma.cc/WFE5-BUDJ].
283. After Virginia’s abolition, Oklahoma executed two men in late 2021,
bringing Oklahoma up to 114 executions. See Execution Database, supra note
119.
284. See Virginia, DPIC (noting there were two executions in 2017)
[https://perma.cc/XSJ6-7VPT].
285. See Hailey Fuchs, Virginia Becomes First Southern State to Abolish the
Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES (last updated Jul. 22, 2021) [https://perma.cc/ZY7PEJQY].
286. See Executions by State and Region Since 1976, DPIC (providing a
breakdown of executions by region) [https://perma.cc/7MXF-SACX].
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eighty-four lynchings between 1877 and 1950. 287 By abolishing the
death penalty, Virginia explicitly expressed its desire to address
the legacy of racial injustice that helped fuel its capital
punishment system. 288
In sum, Virginia’s abolition tilts the national geography of the
death penalty both quantitatively and qualitatively. By the
numbers, Virginia contributes an additional state to the growing
trend towards abolition in our country. 289 But because Virginia
was an active death penalty state in the modern era, its abolition
also likely represents a meaningful subtraction of deaths from
execution totals over time. 290 In addition to these quantitative
changes, the end of Virginia’s death penalty suggests a qualitative
shift: the movement of the abolition trend into the South, where
the death penalty has its strongest legacy. Virginia’s abolition thus
represents
something
different
from
the
legislative
acknowledgement of de facto abolition that might occur in other
states: it represents a change in the people’s acceptance of the
death penalty as a civilized punishment. This development signals

287. See EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, supra note 3, at 3, 40 (stating the number of
lynchings that occurred in Virginia).
288. See, e.g., Gregory S. Schneider, Virginia Abolishes the Death Penalty,
Becoming the First Southern State to Ban Its Use, WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2021)
(“Citing the long history of racial disparity in the way the death penalty has been
applied, with Black defendants far more likely to be executed than White ones,
[Governor Ralph] Northam said the system can no longer be justified.”)
[https://perma.cc/45DT-K9Z3]; id. (“Sen. Scott A. Surovell (D-Fairfax), who
sponsored the Senate version of the bill and has worked against the death penalty
for more than a decade, cited Virginia’s history as both the birthplace of the Bill
of Rights during the Revolution era and a land of racism and violence against
Black people during the time of Jim Crow.”); Colleen Grablick & Christian
Zapata, Northam Signs Bill Ending Death Penalty in Virginia, NPR (Mar. 25,
2021) (“[I]n the lead-up to signing the bill, Northam cited racial discrimination
tied to capital punishment.”) [https://perma.cc/V9LN-Z22E].
289. See, e.g., Gretchen Frazee, How States are Slowly Getting Rid of the
Death Penalty, PBS (Mar. 13, 2019) (highlighting that states are trending away
from using the death penalty) [https://perma.cc/7TAV-XSPQ]; Several States
Consider Repealing or Reforming Death Penalty Laws, ABA (Mar. 10, 2020)
(explaining that efforts to repeal the death penalty have been gaining momentum)
[https://perma.cc/CU62-QFN2].
290. See generally Madeleine Carlisle, Why It’s So Significant Virginia Just
Abolished the Death Penalty, TIME (last updated Mar. 24, 2021) (“[S]ince 1976,
[Virginia] has executed 113 people, a higher percentage of death row inmates
than any other U.S. state.”) [https://perma.cc/M2XE-ADPR].
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that evolving standards of decency no longer support the death
penalty in America.
VI. Conclusion
For forty-five years, our country has accepted the premise that
the death penalty can be administered in a way that is neither
arbitrary nor unusual. Since Gregg, the Supreme Court has
allowed the states and federal government to legislate capital
sentencing schemes, occasionally stepping in to point out that the
chosen process risks too much injustice. This system relies on the
fundamental assumption that a jurisdiction’s capital sentencing
scheme can eliminate arbitrariness through providing for guided
discretion and an individualized assessment of each defendant. No
individual sentencing scheme can eliminate, however, the
arbitrary effects of geography.
The Virginia experience powerfully illustrates the arbitrary
influence of geography on the death penalty. In Virginia, a
minority of jurisdictions used the death penalty, most notably
during the crime panic of the 1990s. 291 But as Virginia’s death
penalty declined, it became increasingly evident that capital
punishment was a local practice. Research suggests that
geographic concentration is a phenomenon attributable to local
decisionmakers, and Virginia’s experience reflects that reality. 292
In the modern era, Virginia’s death penalty was produced and
maintained primarily by certain decisionmakers who avidly
practiced the pursuit of death, sometimes for decades. 293 When
only the county of prosecution is considered, there is a risk that the
role of individual decisionmakers might be obfuscated. But when
considering the vagaries of individual discretion within Virginia’s
active death penalty jurisdictions, the administration of the
modern death penalty appears even more freakish.
291. See Virginia, DPIC (providing search tools to view the local use of the
death penalty) [https://perma.cc/XSJ6-7VPT].
292. See Dieter, supra note 103 (stating that fewer than two percent of
counties in the U.S. account for over half of the nation’s death-row population).
293. See, e.g., Kiehl, supra note 185 (discussing the career of Paul Ebert,
Prince William County’s chief prosecutor for over three decades, whose
prosecutions resulted in more death sentences than any other prosecutor in
Virginia).
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The abolition of Virginia’s death penalty also renders the
national death penalty considerably more arbitrary. Six years
after the Glossip dissent, the trend towards abolition has grown. 294
Virginia adds not only a single state to this picture, but also a
historic legacy of capital punishment in the south. While abolition
in some states might seems inevitable in light of the historic
disinclination of those states toward capital punishment, abolition
in Virginia represents a more significant shift. This is an abolition
that represents evolution, as opposed to a simple legislative
acknowledgement of the status quo.
Of course, much remains to dissect in the retrospective
assessment of Virginia’s death penalty. But both the decline and
abolition of Virginia’s death penalty do suggest a return to one of
the first principles of Eighth Amendment law: the death penalty is
unconstitutional when it is arbitrarily applied. In retrospect, it is
hard to escape the conclusion that Virginia’s death penalty was
anything but arbitrary in its decline. It is equally hard to escape
the conclusion that our national death penalty has become even
more “unusual” without the participation of Virginia, its first and
most prolific executioner.

294. See Frazee, supra note 289 (explaining that there is “a nationwide trend
of states moving away from the death penalty” and that “public support for the
death penalty has waned significantly” since 1996).

